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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
As the Department of Defense (DoD) transforms itself into a fighting force for the 
21st century, changes at the tactical level may or may not reflect the intentions of DoD's 
senior leadership.  The alignment between corporate strategies, business (or tactical) 
functions, and the strategies for designing and implementing Information Technology 
(IT), are vital to success on the modern battlefield.  The Marine Corps has perpetuated an 
ethos of adaptability that lends itself to the DoD’s transformation initiative, but to what 
extent?   
Although the doctrine of transformation is still new, its effects are already being 
felt at the tactical level.  Traditional reliance on radio networks to call for, process and 
control immediate air missions are giving way to digital networks, management 
information systems and decision support systems.  These systems have begun to appear 
in tactical units throughout the Marine Corps, including the aviation command and 
control community.  As with any new system, early integration into existing doctrine and 
tactics, techniques and procedures, has encountered a few problems.   
The Marine Aviation Command and Control System (MACCS) consists of 
various air command and control agencies designed to provide the Marine air-ground task 
force’s (MAGTF’s) aviation combat element (ACE) commander with the ability to 
supervise the application of Marine aviation in support of the MAGTF Commander.  The 
MACCS provides the ACE commander with the air command and control support 
facilities and infrastructure necessary to command, coordinate, and control air operations. 
Principal MACCS agencies are composed of air command and control suites that 
integrate manual and automatic systems to provide air control and direction.   
One of those agencies, the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) has fielded both 
legacy (the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System) and what could be considered 
transformational (the Theater Battle Management Core System) systems.  More detail on 
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these systems is presented in the section on the DASC.  For now, it is sufficient to note 
that these are the primary automated systems for the DASC. 
From experience in the development and fielding of these systems, the author 
noted several problems in attempting to create a seamlessly automated DASC.  Problems 
implementing an automated air support system were seen to stem from interoperability 
failures identified in these new systems during development and operational testing, the 
wide variety of employment configurations of the Marine Corps’ Direct Air Support 
Center (DASC), or a lack of standardized procedures for automated processing of 
immediate requests (possibly due to a combination of the two previous problems and 
organizational blocks). 
In addition, new concepts and equipment, such as the Universal Operations 
Center (UOC) and the Common Aviation Command and Control Suite (CAC2S), will be 
developed and fielded in the midterm (next 5-10 years).  The UOC/CAC2S is going to be 
composed of modular, scalable nodes capable of integrating both legacy and 
transformational IT systems functionality.  The problem is one of aligning the dual 
objectives of business and IT strategy transformation to ensure the direct air support 
function of the future is better equipped and more capable. 
Many researchers have addressed the problems encountered in aligning business 
and IT strategy (Luftman, 1996).  In 1993, Henderson and Venkatraman presented the 
Strategic Alignment Model (Henderson & Venkatraman, 1993), as a way of diagnosing 
the fit between business strategy, organizational infrastructure and processes, IT strategy, 
and information systems infrastructure and processes (see Figure 1 on the next page).  
This model has been accepted and reused by researchers (Burn & Szeto, 2000; Kearns & 
Lederer 2003) to describe an organization’s perceptions of alignment and analyze the 




Figure 1.   The Strategic Alignment Model (After: Henderson and Venkatraman 1993) 
 
B. PURPOSE 
This project focuses on the information systems the Marine Corps is procuring  
for the DASC and as part of the Department of Defense’s Transformation.  Participants in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) identified difficulties the DASC encountered in 
implementing this emerging technology. Initial analysis suggested that the future 
organizational infrastructure and processes required of the DASC have not been formally 
determined.   
The specific objectives for this research were to  
1) Identify the views of senior DASC and MACCS leadership on the strength of 
the MACCS business strategy and its capability to determine the scope, distinctive 
competencies, and governance envisioned in transforming direct air support. 
2) Again, from the same respondents, with additional input from DASC officers 
and senior enlisted Marines, identify their vision for the structure, processes and skills of 
the future direct air support node in order to create an operational definition for the 
organizational infrastructure and processes domain.  
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3) Determine, using a systems analysis perspective, the advantages and 
disadvantages of the tactical data system architecture, processes and operator skills that 
were used during OIF through interviews with those Marines who had the most contact 
with these systems. 
4) Analyze objectives one through three to determine if the alignment 
perspectives predicted by the SAM were present, to what extent, and how this compares 
to the expected perspectives outlined in current MACCS and DASC Transformation 
literature.  
 
C. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
This study will begin with a presentation of the literature that exists concerning 
strategic alignment.  It will then present the model and proceed to analyze the DASC 
from a strategic alignment perspective.  In order to use the SAM, the organizational and 
information systems infrastructure and processes internal to the DASC will be defined in 
relation to the Marine Air Command and Control System’s business and IT strategy.  The 
literature search for the project reviewed the development and execution of corporate and 
business level IT strategy with a focus on implementation.  The SAM is presented in 
detail in Chapter II. 
Next the corporate strategy domain will be defined.  For the DoD and 
Navy/Marine Corps Team, this process is continuous and involves defining the global 
security environment they will operate within in the long term.  The DoD’s 
Transformation Planning Guidance, the Navy’s Seapower 21, and the Marine Corps’ 
Strategy 21 define this corporate strategy and are looked at in detail in Chapter III.  
Business strategy further refines corporate strategy by creating the short and midterm 
goals needed to achieve the strategic vision.  Business strategy is used to explain how the 
Marine Corps will compete on the modern battlefield and includes its IT strategy.   
 Business strategy can be further refined into functional areas.  Such is the case in 
the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) papers The Roadmap and 
MACCS Employment Options, also covered in Chapter III.     A definition of the IT 
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strategy domain will conclude Chapter III with a description of the MACCS’ Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) initiatives. 
Once the external business and IT strategies have been identified, this paper will 
address the internal structures and processes.  Interviews were conducted to answer the 
questions detailed in the objectives and the results of those interviews are presented 
throughout this paper.  First, due to the lack of an official description of what the 
transformed DASC will like, an operating definition, as described by both junior and 
senior members of the Aviation Command and Control community will be developed. 
The current organization and vision for the future of Direct Air Support will be developed 
in Chapter IV.   
Next, in Chapter V, the DASC as it existed during OIF will be presented from a 
Systems Analysis perspective to highlight the incongruencies of fit between the IT 
infrastructure and business processes.    Also, a detailed systems analysis of data flow 
within the DASC during Operation Iraqi Freedom will be presented which will describe 
how IT systems are currently organized within the DASC.  
Chapter VI will analyze the perspectives on alignment found among the senior 
officer and enlisted Marines interviewed.  These perspectives will be examined for their 
potential impact on development and fielding if transformation systems. The last chapter 
will take the identified perspectives, and  known enablers and inhibitors to alignment, to 
make recommendations for strengthening the strategic alignment of the DASC. 
Although the SAM is necessarily a cross-level model, for the purposes of analysis 
all data will be collected and analyzed at the lower level of that model, i.e., at the DASC 
level.  Thus, although the conclusions of this research may have implications for other 
units within the MACCS, and indeed, to other organizations and sub-units within the 
Marine Corps, those implications will not be examined in detail, and remain outside the 




D. METHODOLGY AND RESEARCH PROTOCOL 
This section will outline the procedures used to define the domains of the 
Strategic Alignment Model and present arguments for its validity and reliability for use in 
the DoD setting. 
1. Objectives and Research Issues 
The primary analytic task of this project is the application of the Strategic 
Alignment Model (SAM) to the business processes of the MACCS and the DASC, and 
the IT processes that support them.  Accomplishing this task required the instantiation 
and critical assessment of the four domains of model, and their linkages.   
Since this is essentially qualitative research, the case study method was used to 
collect and analyze the processes, and interpretation of the roles, of IT in the MACCS 
and DASC.  Case study research has been shown to be particularly well suited to testing 
the presence or absence of the expected elements of an existing theory like the SAM 
(Yin, 1994).  The main elements of a Case Study are a) the research questions (see the 
Field Research Interview Schedule appendix), b) the tested theory (the SAM), c) 
identifiable units of analysis (in this case the perspectives found within the SAM), d) the 
specific methods used (covered below) and e) a criteria for evaluating the interview 
schedule and results for validity and reliability (also covered later) (Lee, 1999). 
2. Field Procedures 
Field procedures, if set up and executed properly (Lee, 1999), can add elements of 
reliability to a case study.  The field procedures for this study were taken from 
suggestions by Lee. 
a. Researcher Credentials 
The researcher is a DASC officer with over 13 years in the Marine Corps, 
including seven years in the DASC and three in the Infantry.  As a school-trained 
Weapons and Tactics Instructor, he was responsible for both the training of DASC 
officers and enlisted Marines, as well as providing Marine Aviation Command and 
Control battlestaff planning to the Air Combat Element and 1st Marine Division.  As the 
lead Tactical Data Systems evaluator for Marine Air Support Squadron 3, he participated 
in numerous Operational Test and Evaluation Exercises for many of the IT systems in the 
 7
DASC and wrote the DASC Standard Operating Procedures for the Advanced Field 
Artillery Tactical Data System. 
b. Site Specifications 
Data on systems use and performance during OIF were collected from 
Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton and Marine Corps Air Station Miramar in San 
Diego, California.  Camp Pendleton is the home base of the First Marine Expeditionary 
Force, the senior Marine unit deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Additional data was 
collected via telephone interviews with personnel stationed at Marine Aviation Weapons 
and Tactics Squadron 1 in Yuma, Arizona and the Aviation Command and Control 
Branch of the Aviation Department at Headquarters, United States Marine Corps in 
Washington, D.C. 
c. Sources of Information 
The business and IT strategy of the MACCS were instantiated primarily 
through published literature and semi-structured interviews, as was the infrastructure, 
architecture and skills of the DASC.  The interview schedule was used to validate the 
SAM and its applicability to defining business and IT alignment in a Marine Corps 
tactical environment. This included both archival and interview data collected from 
DASC Marines and MACCS leadership in the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, DASC subject 
matter experts at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1, and the Aviation 
Command and Control Advocates at HQMC.  All interviews were audio taped for later 
transcription.   
3.   Case Study Questions 
The case study questions were designed to instantiate the SAM, provide senior 
tactical leadership views on alignment, and develop a systems analysis model of the 
DASC during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
a. Data Collection 
This research protocol and the accompanying interview schedule were 
developed following standard methods (Lee, 1999; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991).  A pilot 
test was conducted using personnel familiar with (but not currently assigned to) the 
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MACCS/DASC, and the interview schedule was modified to allow the questions on 
alignment to be better understood.  Pilot test responses were not used in the coding and 
analysis phase.  
b. Research Questions 
The questions used to evaluate objectives one through three were 
presented during a semi-structured conversational interview.  The interview schedule 
used pre-existing open-ended questions designed to stimulate a discussion of the 
interviewees’ opinions and views.  Similar to both the Luftman and Brier (1999) and 
Burn and Szeto (1999) instruments, the schedule focused on determining how the 
interviewees think strategic alignment is being attained within the MACCS and DASC.  
Specifically, the questions for Objectives one and two were asked of Marines serving as 
Senior Air Directors/Crew Chiefs or higher during OIF.  These questions were asked in 
the order conducted by Luftman and Brier (1996) to determine the interviewee's 
perceptions of the relative strengths of the domains found in the SAM.  This helped 
identify the perspectives found in the community and which were then mapped to the 
SAM to measure fit and confirm whether the model is valid for the DASC.  The group of 
senior Marines were also asked the questions used to define the operating definition 
required by Objective three.  The questions used to evaluate Objective four were 
designed to identify all external agencies that input and received data from the DASC, 
how that information was processed within the DASC, and what communication 
mediums were used to transfer the data during OIF. 
c. Method of Data Analysis 
Interviews were coded and analyzed using NVIVO software (Richards, 
1999), which was also used to develop and instantiate the linkages in the model and 
address the issues in Objective five.  The processes of the DASC were captured using 
standard Systems Analysis methodologies (Kowal, 1988).  Entity-relationship diagrams, 
and where necessary, data-flow diagrams were used to portray the essential elements of 
the processes.  Subject-matter experts working in the DASC, and on IT systems for the 
DASC validated these diagrams at the end of the interview process.  Specific techniques 
for analyzing the data included pattern matching and matching independent variables 
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(Lee, 1999).  These techniques were used to determine if expected patterns from the 
SAM, could be fit to the interviewees’ responses by specifying the combination of 
domains that would define that perspective and observing if that combination occurs.  In 
every interview, the model was validated, as all interviewees’ perceptions were congruent 
with the model’s perspectives. 
d. Validity 
Lee (1999) addresses several issues concerning validity.  Construct 
validity describes the ability of the interview schedule to actually measure the patterns 
expected of by the SAM within the sample of interviewees.  External validity asks 
whether the case study can be repeated elsewhere.  To address these two issues this 
protocol drew several tactics from Yin (1994). 
1) The research protocol used multiple sources of evidence by interviewing 
personnel from both within and outside (but connected to) the DASC.  In addition, 
written materials such as logbooks and after-action items were analyzed. 
2) The research protocol established a chain of evidence by demonstrating the 
interview schedule follows a “logical progression of data” (Lee, 1999).  This was 
accomplished by using a developed theory to construct the schedule, in this case the 
SAM. 
3) The research protocol had the interviewees review the analysis of their 
interviews for accuracy.  This was conducted by emailing the transcribed interviews 
to the interviewees.  All transcriptions were validated. 
4) As for external validity, this research case made the assumption that since 
both Luftman and Brier (1999) and Burn and Szeto (1999) have been able to 
successfully use the SAM to identify strategic perspectives across multiple industries, 
there was a strong probability that it could be used within the Marine Corps. 
e. Reliability 
Reliability relates to the analysis applied to the results of the interviews 
and its ability to accurately reflect what the interviewees meant.  Yin (1994) also 
addressed reliability and his following suggestions were incorporated as well. 
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1) Write a thorough case protocol in order to ensure the test can be repeated 
with the same expected results. 
2) The data must be presentable in a database in a logical meaningful manner.  
This was accomplished using the NVIVO software (Richards, 1999). 
3) Transcription reliability (Lee, 1999) can be adequately ensured by having 
an independent observer read the transcribed conversations while listening to the 
audiotape.  A very patient independent observer mentioned in the acknowledgments 
did this for hours on end. 
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II. ALIGNING BUSINESS AND IT STRATEGY 
Questions regarding exactly how to align a corporation’s business and IT 
strategies have essentially revolved around a basic conundrum:  Does available 
technology drive your business processes or do your processes dictate the types of IT you 
will implement? (Venkatraman, 1994)  Volumes have been written on this subject, from 
both the IT and corporate perspectives.  The answer, though, appears to be somewhere in 
the middle.  Though it may sound contrite, the answer to what should be the driver of 
change in an organization really should be, “it depends.”  It depends on the value of the 
IT to the organization; it depends on the level of need for business process reengineering; 
and it depends on the type and cost of the technology available. 
The real question to ask, then, is not whether technology is driving change, or 
vice versa, but rather what is the fit between business and IT?  The Strategic Alignment 
Model addresses this question by pointing out that there are two questions to ask of any 
given corporation:  what is the strength of the link between external business and IT 
strategy – called strategic integration, and what is the strength of the link between 
internal business processes and the physical IT architecture that supports it – called 
operational integration (Henderson & Venkatraman, 1999).  In order to understand the 
relationship between this strategic fit and functional integration, Henderson and 
Venkatraman outlined the four domains shown in Figure 1.  The definition of these 
domains, and their interaction, will be discussed in the following sections.  For ease of 
reading, the rest of this chapter relies heavily on the Henderson and Venkatraman work 
previously cited. 
 
A. BUSINESS STRATEGY 
Defining a business strategy is vital to success.  In the corporate world, it defines 
how and where a business is going to compete. On the battlefield however, business 
strategy becomes a more serious game, with not just survival, but victory as the goal.  A 
firm’s business strategy includes decisions on its scope, distinctive competencies and 
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governance (Luftman & Brier, 1999).  As will be seen, there are distinct parallels with 
these three elements in the military. 
Business scope defines where the corporation competes.  For corporations this 
includes a definition of their markets and a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 
threats (SWOT) analysis of those markets and their competitors.  The military conducts 
exactly the same kinds of analyses from the strategic level National Military Strategy all 
the way down to a tactical Estimate of the Situation (Mission, Enemy, Terrain and 
Weather, Troops and Fire Support Available, and Time Available). 
Distinctive Competencies are those things that are at the core of a business that 
make it competitive.  A business develops these core competencies over time, modifying 
or weeding out those that do not contribute to the overall success of the enterprise.  The 
military has done much the same thing through the specialization of its branches of the 
armed services.  The Navy’s core competencies focus control of the seas.  The Marines 
give the Navy the capability to project power ashore.  The Army has excelled in 
developing its ground combat capabilities.  And the Air Force specializes in long-range 
interdiction of the battlefield. 
Business governance describes how a corporation chooses to enter a particular 
market.  Issues that need to be addressed include whether to go it alone, or attempt to 
form partnerships and relationships with other companies.  In the Transformation 
Planning Guidance Secretary Rumsfeld states that, “it is in our interest to make 
arrangements for international military cooperation to ensure that rapidly transforming 
U.S. capabilities can be applied effectively with allied and coalition capabilities.”  Thus, 
the DoD recognizes the inherent advantage to creating systems that are both joint and 
interoperable with our allies as will be shown in Chapter III. 
 
B. IT STRATEGY 
Defining the scope of what constitutes IT strategy is difficult at best.  One such 
attempt to define IT strategy and how it is formulated is provided by Lederer and Sethi 
(1988), "The process of deciding the objectives for organizational computing and 
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identifying potential computer applications which the organization should implement.”  
While this definition provides a broad overview of IT strategy, it does not cover 
sufficient ground for the purposes of this paper. The tie-in with the business strategy of 
an organization is essential to the success of an IT strategy.  Thus, a more refined 
definition is needed. 
K. Hugh Macdonald in his development of the Strategic Alignment Process (a 
linked-stages model for achieving strategic alignment using the SAM), defines IT 
strategy as being “derived from a global technology platform which represents the 
potential capability available to the organization and the key technical issues and trends 
to be taken into account” (Morton, 1991).  This would seem to contrast with Henderson 
and Venkatraman’s own definition, which is: 
Defined in terms of choices pertaining to the positioning of the business in 
the IT marketplace and is analogous to the business strategy.  It is defined 
in terms of three basic dimensions: technology scope (articulated in terms 
of the range of IT capabilities of the organization, such as image 
processing, global banking networks, or electronic gateways); distinctive 
competencies (articulated in terms of the salient characteristics in the IT 
arena that distinguish the firm in the IT marketplace, such as connectivity 
capabilities, cost-performance, reliability, and safety); and IT governance 
(articulated in terms of the nature of cooperative relationships, such as 
joint ventures and strategic alliances in the IT arena. 
While the first two definitions certainly have merit, given the detailed nature of 
Henderson and Venkatraman’s own definition, this paper will use theirs in describing the 
external IT strategy of the MACCS in Chapter III. 
 
C. ORGANIZATION INFRASTRUCTURE AND PROCESSES 
From the SAM, the major themes within the internal business processes relate to 
the choices a business makes in regards to its administrative infrastructure, processes and 
skills.  Venkatraman calls the results of these choices, “the particular internal 
arrangements and configurations that support the organization’s chosen position” 
(Morton, 1991).  Henderson, Venkatraman and Oldach (Luftman, 1996) go on to  refine 
the three themes: 
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(1) the administrative structure (functional or divisional or matrix 
organization), (2) the design or redesign of critical business processes 
(product delivery, product development, customer service), and (3) the 
acquisition and development of human resource skills. 
When describing the current structure of the DASC and creating the operational 
definition of the future of direct air support in Chapter IV, this paper will focus on those 
three themes; internal organization, critical functions, and personnel training and 
development. 
 
D. IT INFRASTRUCTURE AND PROCESSES 
IT infrastructure and processes closely follow Organization Infrastructure and 
processes.  Continuing with Henderson and Venkatraman’s definitions, the internal IT 
domain has three aspects, IT architecture, IT processes, and IT skills.  Keeping the 
sections for comparison within the same context allows for ease of analysis of the 
strengths of the linkages between the two domains.  For the SAM these sections are: 
Defined in terms of choices pertaining to the internal arrangements that 
determine the data, applications, and technology infrastructure to deliver 
the required IT products and services (Luftman, 1996). 
Again, given this definition, Chapter V will evaluate the data flow that existed in 
the DASC during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Specifically, the analysis will focus on the 
systems that were used, how information was routed (both manually and using 
information systems), and the required skills involved with not only maintaining the 
systems, but using them as well. 
 
E. THE STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT MODEL PERSPECTIVES 
Once the two external and two internal domains have been defined for a given 
organization there are several ways to apply the SAM.  Henderson and Venkatraman 
developed the original model as a result of their research with the IBM Consulting 
Group.  Throughout the 1980s IBM collaborated with the academic world to create a way 
of viewing, analyzing, describing and strengthening the relationship between business 
and IT.  IBM Consulting then applied the resulting model with their clients (Luftman, 
1996).   Since its original development the SAM has been expanded as a result of a study 
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conducted at IBM’s Advanced Business Institute from 1992-1994 (Papp & Luftman, 
1995), and validated in separate trials (Burns & Szeto, 2000; Papp & Luftman, 1995a).  
As well, it has been turned into a process by which alignment can be achieved, but that 
will be covered in detail in Chapter VII.  First, it is necessary to describe the perspectives 
that can be found within the model. 
1.  Perspectives 
So what is alignment?  Alignment is simply the integration of the four domains 
that produces the optimal outcome.  When the IT strategy is correctly reflected in the 
internal architecture and both support the overall business strategy and day-to-day 
operations of an organization, at the best cost, then you have achieved optimal alignment.  
However, trying to align across all four domains simultaneously can be extremely 
difficult.  The easiest way would be to align two domains at a time (Business strategy and 
IT strategy for example), but this would fail to take internal functions (reality) into 
consideration.  Therefore, Henderson and Venkatraman described four multivariate 
relationships that align three of the domains on both the functional and strategic axis.  
These alignment perspectives, described below, begin with the identification of a driver 
for change in the organization.  This is usually considered the strongest domain and so is 
called the anchor.  The domain in the most need of strengthening, the pivot, is usually the 
area identified by the business leader as the one in need of changing.  The third domain, 
called the impacted domain, is the one which will be most affected by a change in the 
anchor domain.  The first two alignment perspectives identified by Henderson and 
Venkatraman focus on business strategy as the driving force for change, while the second 








a. Strategy Execution 
 
 
Figure 2.   Strategy Execution Perspective (From: Henderson & Venkatraman, 1993) 
 
This perspective reflects an organization that has a strong business 
strategy, but that is undergoing, or in need of, business process reengineering.  Therefore 
the business strategy becomes the driver of both organizational, and ultimately IT, 
infrastructure.  Henderson and Venkatraman note that this is the classical view of 
management and would therefore be expected to be the most prevalent perspective. 
b. Technology Transformation 
 




This perspective tries to optimize the internal IT infrastructure by 
changing the IT strategy to better align with the overall business strategy.  It is pursued 
by organizations that have identified an IT strategy through the development of their 
business strategy.  This IT strategy is then used to design and create a system that 
supports it.  Thus the business strategy, which identifies areas in which an organization 
plans to excel, defines the IT strategy to support those areas, leading to the design of an 
IT infrastructure that supports the business strategy.   
c. Competitive Potential 
 
Figure 4.   Competitive Potential Perspective (From: Henderson & Venkatraman, 1993) 
 
Competitive potential involves the recognition by an organization that its 
strength lies in its technological superiority in some facet.  Using this superiority to its 
advantage the organization adjusts its business model to take full advantage of the edge 
given by its technology, which affects the way it conducts business on a day-to-day basis.  
From this perspective, new or emerging technology is used to define what an 







d. Service Level 
 
Figure 5.   Service Level Perspective (From: Henderson & Venkatraman, 1993) 
 
Customer satisfaction is the focus of a service level perspective.  Using 
this perspective and organization uses its IT strategy drive changes to the IT architecture 
in order to provide the best possible services to the customer (in this case the user).  By 
improving IT service the end user’s time and capabilities are optimized, providing high 
quality service faster than before. 
2. Other Perspectives  
From 1992-1994, Papp and Luftman conducted a study of over 300 firms, 
applying the SAM to validate the perspectives outlined by Henderson and Venkatraman 
(Papp & Luftman, 1995a).  While they were able to validate the domains and four 
perspectives, they found that four perspectives were inadequate to describe the range of 
ideas about aligning business and IT strategy.  In fact, eight new perspectives were 
validated during the research (Papp & Luftman, 1995).  In addition, the researchers found 
that the dominant perspectives varied by industry, and even by position within the 
company.  This often led to several perspectives towards alignment within the same 
organization, which points to a stronger need for leadership to make its perspective clear 
and known.  Of the eight new perspectives identified, four followed the same pattern 
identified by Henderson and Venkatraman and were described in Competing in the 
Information Age (Luftman, 1996).  During the research for this paper, four of the new 
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perspectives, called fusion perspectives because they are combinations of existing 
perspectives, were not identified as existing in the DASC community.  Therefore, the 
fusion perspectives are not given consideration here. 
 
Figure 6.   Other Perspectives (From: Papp & Luftman, 1995) 
 
 
a. Organizational IT Infrastructure 
This perspective is taken when a newly reengineered business process 
identifies the need for a change in IT architecture to support the new tasks and processes. 
b. IT Infrastructure Strategy 
From a military point of view, this perspective can occur when a current 
IT system is improved or modified to become more interoperable with other external 
systems.  The organization is then better able to network and thus has to redefine its 
operating environment. 
c. IT Organizational Infrastructure 
This perspective is usually taken when an organization adapts its processes 
to fit a newly acquired IT system, changing its outlook in the process.  This is the result 
of an ‘IT drives strategy’ approach that will only work if the organization is decentralized 
enough to allow bottom-up transformation with the IT manager playing a leading role. 
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d. Organizational Infrastructure Strategy 
The organizational infrastructure strategy occurs when the results of a 
business reengineering process are used to define the corporate strategy, which leads to 
the adoption of a new IT strategy. 
The next two chapters will be used to define the four domains of the SAM 
in terms of the Direct Air Support Center.  Starting with the external business and IT 
strategy, followed by the organizational and IT infrastructures, this paper will then 
identify the dominant perspectives found among the DASC and MACCS senior 
leadership.  Finally, the strength of the strategic alignment will be examined from the 
perspective of enablers and inhibitors to alignment, concluding with an analysis of their 






III. EXTERNAL BUSINESS AND IT STRATEGY 
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION 
As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld took office in January 2001, he already 
had a clear understanding of his vision for the Department of Defense.  His belief that the 
world was in a state of transformation has since been translated into a need for the 
military to undergo its own changes.  At his swearing in ceremony, he identified the 
drivers for change.   
We may not be in the process of transition to something that will follow 
the Cold War. Rather, we may be in a period of continuing change, and if 
so, the sooner we wrap our heads around that fact, the sooner we can get 
about the business of making this nation and its citizens as safe and secure 
as they must be in our new national security environment. (Rumsfeld, 
2001) 
  
Later, at his introduction to the Pentagon and the military’s senior leadership, he 
let the world know that the changes he envisioned would affect every aspect of the 
Department of Defense from strategy to budgeting. 
Make no mistake: keeping America safe in such a world is a challenge 
that's well within our reach, provided we work now and we work together 
to shape budgets, programs, strategies and force structure to meet threats 
we face and those that are emerging, and also to meet the opportunities 
we're offered to contribute to peace, stability and freedom. But the 
changes we make in our defense posture, the innovations we introduce, 
take time to be made part of a great military force. We need to get about 
the business of making these changes now in order to remain strong, not 
just in this decade, but also in decades to come. (Rumsfeld, 2001a) 
Initially there was strong resistance to the idea that America was indeed 
threatened to the point that it needed to overhaul the entire National Security Strategy.  
However that all changed on September 11, 2001 when America was shown just how 





1. Transforming How We Do Business 
The Department of Defense is dedicated to realigning its business and acquisition 
strategies to reflect the changing dynamics of today’s operational environment.  To that 
end, it has streamlined the acquisition cycle time and introduced spiral development.  
Spiral development delivers new systems in increments, with a period for the end user to 
field and evaluate the new system at each increment. It also allows opportunities to 
rapidly inject new technology as a system develops.  The program managers then 
incorporate what is learned in each new spiral, which is supposed to result in more 
reliable schedules and cost estimates.  
2. Transforming How We Work With Others 
As September 11th taught us, it is vital that all military components, indeed all 
federal Departments and Agencies, learn how to integrate at a national level.  Only 
through information sharing, interdepartmental coordination, and system interoperability 
can national power be truly integrated. 
3. Transforming How We Fight 
Transforming how we fight includes development of future warfighting concepts 
across several military capability areas: doctrine, organization, material, leadership and 
education, personnel and facilities  (Department of Defense, 2003).  According to the 
Transformation Planning Guidance issued in April 2003, transforming our capabilities is 
the result of transforming our force. This research focuses almost solely on the impact the 
Transformation effort has on units at the tactical level, reflecting this particular goal of 
transformation.   
Force Transformation will require our forces to be more network-centric and less 
platform-centric.  Forces will be able to be distributed farther apart across the battlespace 
when information sharing becomes common to all units.  Specifically, “U.S. forces will 
leverage asymmetric advantages to the fullest extent possible, drawing upon unparalleled 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities that provide joint common relevant operational 
situational awareness of the battlespace, rapid and robust sensor-to-shooter targeting, 
reach back and other necessary prerequisites for network-centric warfare” (Department of 
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Defense, 2003).  Thus, the development of a comprehensive C4ISR strategy is a key to 
transforming the DoD. 
Now that the broad strokes of transformation have been defined, the rest of the 
chapter will begin to peel the layers off the onion to show how transformation is being 
implemented at the tactical level. 
 
B. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS TRANSFORMATION 
The Transformation Planning Guidance also mandates that the secretaries of the 
military departments and the service chiefs of staff develop Transformation Roadmaps 
that outline a plan of action towards fulfilling the change mandate.  The Navy and the 
Marine Corps have long recognized the need to continuously evaluate their capabilities 
and requirements and several documents have been produced in recent years that define 
the Navy/Marine Corps' concept for the 21st Century.   
The Naval Transformation Roadmap: Power and Access…From the Sea is the 
Navy’s outline for implementing the DoD’s transformation guidelines.  It presents the 
transformational capabilities of Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing, each of which 
addresses specific Critical Operational Goals that have been identified by the DoD.  All 
of these capabilities fall under the umbrella of FORCENet, which provides the 
architecture for the Navy/Marine Corps’ network-centric warfare for the 21st century.  
This architecture is being designed to integrate all the C4ISR assets from the battlefield 
all the way to the Pentagon to provide a real-time common picture of the battlefield to all 
users of that information (Department of the Navy, 2003). 
For the Marine Corps, these concepts found within the Navy’s Sea Strike 
capability have been refined through several iterations; from From the Sea to 
Forward…From the Sea to Operational Maneuver from the Sea and Ship-to-Objective 
Maneuver and finally to the current capstone concepts embodied in Seapower 21, Marine 
Corps Strategy 21 and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Throughout these documents 
the Marine Corps has developed systems and processes to handle the requirements of 
change.  
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 For example, a series of Commandant of the Marine Corps’ Policy Memoranda 
(CMC Policy Memos) outlined the organization of the Expeditionary Force Development 
Center.  These memoranda resulted in Marine Corps Order 3900.15A, Marine Corps 
Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS), which identified the procedures for 
conducting the four phases in identifying and developing future capabilities:  Force 
Capability Development, Requirement Development, Prioritization and Resourcing, and 
Capability Fielding and Transition (United States Marine Corps, 2002).   The mission of 
the EFDS is to integrate all of these phases to ensure the warfighter is equipped with not 
only new C4ISR systems, but also the training and confidence in those systems required 
to use them effectively.  
  
C. TRANSFORMATION OF MARINE CORPS AVIATION COMMAND AND 
CONTROL 
In the Department of Defense Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System, requirements are translated into equipment, organization and capabilities at the 
tactical level (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003).  When these three elements 
are congruent with each other at that level, we can say they are aligned.  Strategic 
alignment is a process defined by the leaders of an organization that  “begins by setting 
the organizational goals and establishes a team.  The importance of setting a clear 
direction for the organization prior to selecting technologies and how they will be applied 
cannot be overlooked.” (Luftman & Brier, 1999) In addition to defining the 
transformation process, the Marine Corps’ EFDS formalized the guidance given in CMC 
Policy Memo 1-99, titled “Advocacy”.  This memo had identified the requirement for 
personnel stationed at Headquarters Marine Corps to be delineated as advocates for each 
element of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force.  Among their many initiatives, advocates 
are responsible for being that link between the Fleet Marine Forces and the requirements 
generation and acquisition processes.  
Advocacy for the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) fell to the Deputy 
Commandant, Aviation as head of the Aviation Department, Headquarters Marine Corps.  
The Aviation Department was further subdivided into advocates for the various functions 
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of Marine Aviation.  The Aviation Command and Control Branch was delegated the task 
of producing concept papers for Air C2.  These books were intended to provide direction 
to the MACCS concerning how it should train, organize, and equip for the 21st century.  
Subsequently two parts in a three part series have been approved and published. 
Part One: The Roadmap, The Marine Air Command and Control System and 
Operational Maneuver from the Sea was published in December 1999.  It outlined the 
goals for the MACCS in the 21st Century (streamlined information management/data 
fusion, expeditionary packaging, and the creation of information warriors) and detailed 
the systems that were in development to achieve those goals.  Technological trends were 
predicted to, “result in a streamlined, networked air control system provided by the 
MACCS” (United States Marine Corps, 2001).  In addition, the procedural control of 
aircraft, as explained in the next section, was foreseen to include a Single Integrated Air 
Picture (SIAP).  A SIAP would bring a radar view of the airspace above the battlefield to 
Marines in the DASC who had never seen a radar picture before.  Part One also predicted 
a shared data environment, which would allow the MACCS to interface with all other 
MAGTF agencies to obtain a real-time operational picture of the battlefield.  
The second book, Part Two: MACCS Employment Options, The Marine Air 
Command and Control System and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, described how the 
MACCS would be employed to support the concepts found in the Marine Corps' 
transformational capstone concept, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.  The employment 
options would need an operational architecture that supported numerous communications 
networks, could perform any or all of the functions of the MACCS, and was capable of 
deploying as an operational facility anywhere on the battlefield.  Thus, the physical and 
organizational aspects of the future MACCS had to be flexible and scaleable as well as 
robust in its capabilities. Part Two stopped short of describing the technical details of 
how the C4ISR systems would be linked and used to create a systems architecture.  One 
of the first attempts to create a seamless architecture was made during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  We will be taking a look at that architecture within the DASC in Chapter V. 
The third, as yet unpublished, book is supposed to show how the goals in Part 
One and the concepts in Part Two will affect the future organization, training and people 
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of the MACCS (United States Marine Corps, 1999). In a special report titled “State of 
Marine Aviation” to the May 2003 Marine Corps Gazette, Lt Gen Michael Hough, the 
Deputy Commandant for Aviation recognized the lack of a coherent definition of future 
MACCS agencies.  To that end, he ordered the formation of a  Transition Task Force 
(TTF), “to recommend doctrinal and organizational changes needed to fight and win in 
any global battlespace” (Hough, 2003).  However, interviews with members of the TTF 
indicate that, due to Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, work on the 
Transition Task Force has been slow in gaining momentum. 
 
D. MACCS IT STRATEGY 
The second domain to be defined is the external IT strategy.  This is presented 
here as a top-down strategy from the DoD to the MACCS. 
1. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) for the 21st Century 
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review identified six operational goals necessary 
to implement the new defense strategy.  Four of these had either direct or indirect ties to 
the DoD’s C4ISR strategy.  The key one, “Leveraging information technology and 
innovative concepts to develop an interoperable, joint C4ISR architecture and capability 
that includes a tailorable joint picture” (DoD, 2003), is designed to specifically provide 
the warfighter with superior situational awareness and the capability to maneuver more 
easily across the battlespace. 
In order to achieve this objective the Transformation Planning Guidance charges 
the Commander of Joint Forces Command to develop a plan that addresses the C4ISR 
priorities.  These include a common relevant operational picture for joint forces and 
selected sensor-to-shooter linkages prioritized by contribution to the joint operating 
concepts. 
2. MACCS IT Systems 
In the last three years the MACCS has had two new tactical data systems added as 
systems of record.  These systems represent a step in the incremental approach to 
achieving the vision found in Transformation documents.  The Theater Battle 
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Management Core System (TBMCS) is a Joint mandated air-war planning tool for 
generation, dissemination and execution of the Air Tasking Order (ATO).  The other 
system, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), is an automated 
fire support command and control (C2) system that replaces aging systems, while adding 
additional fire support capabilities and providing a more robust hardware platform. 
AFATDS is a Multi-Service fire support system utilized by both the US Army 
and US Marine Corps, thereby providing for digital fire support interoperability between 
the two services.  Within the MACCS, AFATDS was intended to automate the reception 
of immediate air support requests, battlefield geometry and display real-time updates on 
current fire missions (including the active gun to target lines). 
3. MACCS Future Systems 
The future of IT systems in the MACCS resides in the development of the 
Common Aviation Command and Control Suite (CAC2S).  CAC2S will modernize the 
capability of the MACCS to support the planning and execution of aviation operations.   
CAC2S will replace current legacy systems with a common suite of equipment.  It will 
not replace air defense weapons, radios, or sensors organic to the MACCS, but will 
consolidate the existing functionality of legacy MACCS systems into a single system 
capable of performing those various functions with a common suite of equipment and 
software applications. 
CAC2S will provide operators with planning and execution capabilities for 
aviation operations that will interface with legacy MACCS systems (i.e. AFATDS and 
TBMCS), current MAGTF C4I systems, jointly - mandated systems and future Joint and 
MAGTF C4I systems.  It will allow operators to execute current operations while 
simultaneously conducting planning for future operations.  The primary intent of the 
CAC2S is to ensure that the MACCS is capable of supporting MAGTF operations in both 
current and emerging operational environments. It will be built in three increments with 
each increment focusing on specific MACCS functions.  The DASC suite will be fielded  
















IV. DASC ORGANIZATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
PROCESSES  
The Strategic Alignment Model identifies three elements within the internal 
business domain: Administrative Structure, Processes and Skills.  Administrative 
Structure refers to the “roles, responsibilities, and authority structures of the enterprise” 
(Luftman, 1996) and focuses on typical organizational questions involving span of 
control, mechanistic vs. organic organization and the degree of functional integration.  
The Processes are those critical functions that the business unit performs to accomplish 
the goals outlined in the external strategy.  Measures of effectiveness are designed around 
these mission essential tasks, attempting to ensure that only value-added activities are 
performed.  The Skills required to perform the Processes involve such questions as the 
level and types of training required of the individual members and to what extent will 
new processes require new skills.  This chapter will define the current organizational 
infrastructure and processes of the DASC, and then present the results of that part of the 
research involved with creating the operational definition of the organization, processes 
and skills required of the direct air support function of the near to mid-term.  Throughout 
the rest of this study, any quotations without direct attributes were taken from the 
confidential interviews conducted in conjunction with this research. 
A. CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE  
As the nexus between air support and the ground combat element, the DASC is 
charged with executing and integrating the current day’s Air Tasking Order (ATO) with 
the ground element’s fires.  The ATO is a document used to inform command and control 
agencies of projected aircraft sorties, targets and specific missions. Normally the ATO 
provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as 
well as general instructions.  
As outlined in the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-25.5, Direct 
Air Support Center Handbook, the DASC is the principal Marine air command and 
control system (MACCS) air control agency responsible for the direction of air 
operations directly supporting ground forces.  It functions in a decentralized mode of 
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operation, but is directly supervised by the Marine Tactical Air Command Center 
(Marine TACC).  The DASC’s parent unit is the Marine Air Support Squadron of the 
Marine Air Control Group (see Figure 7).  Thus, administratively, or on a day-to-day 
basis, the DASC does not exist as an entity.  It is only during military exercises or real 
world operations that the DASC is formed from the Marine Air Support Squadron.  The 
Marine Corps has four Marine Aircraft Wings (3 active and 1 reserve).  Each Wing has 




































                       
Figure 7.   Marine Air Control Group Organization Chart (After: Department of the Navy,  
2001) 
 
Internal structure (reporting relationships, etc.) of a MASS is largely left up to the 
Commanding Officer, thus each MASS is organized slightly differently.  In addition, 
each MASS supports a set of real-world Operations Plans.  These Operations Plans may 
require the DASC to emphasize different aspects of their capabilities (i.e., one plan may 
rely more heavily on the use of an Airborne DASC than other plans).  The result is that a 
DASC in one situation may be task-organized differently than another.  The rest of this 
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section identifies the organization and tasks required of the DASC in general.  The 
projections of the future of direct air support were taken from interviews with personnel 
involved in training, organizing, and equipping the DASC in direct support of the 1st 
Marine Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  While this may bias their opinions 
towards the types of Operation Plans they support, most of the interviewees have also 
served in at least one other MASS and thus have a broader perspective on which they 
based their answers. 
In general, the DASC crew is task-organized to meet operational requirements.  
Crewmembers are assigned positions based on their level of qualification and experience. 
Figure 8 on the next page shows a notional DASC organization.  A full description of the 
individual positions and their tasks within the DASC can be found in the Internal DASC 
Organization appendix.    
 
Figure 8.   DASC Organization (From: MCWP 3-25.5) 
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B. DASC PROCESSES 
The DASC processes immediate air support requests; coordinates aircraft 
employment with other supporting arms; manages terminal control assets supporting 
GCE and combat service support element forces; and controls assigned aircraft, 
unmanned aerial vehicles, and itinerant aircraft transiting through DASC controlled 
airspace.  The DASC controls and directs air support activities affecting the ground 
combat commander's focus on close operations and those air missions requiring 
integration with the ground combat forces (close air support, assault support, and 
designated air reconnaissance).  The DASC does not normally control aircraft conducting 
deep air support (DAS) missions as detailed coordination of DAS missions are not 
required with ground forces.  Specific tasks of the DASC not previously mentioned 
include: 
1. When delegated authority by the aviation combat element (ACE) commander 
and in coordination with the GCE’s senior Fire Support Coordination Center 
(FSCC), adjusts preplanned schedules, diverts airborne assets, and launches 
aircraft as necessary. 
2. Coordinates the execution of direct air support missions with other supporting 
arms through the appropriate FSCC and, as required, with the appropriate 
MACCS agencies. 
3. Receives and disseminates pertinent tactical information reported by aircraft 
performing direct air support missions. 
4. Provides aircraft and air control agencies with advisory and threat information 
to assist in the safe conduct of flight. 
5. Monitors, records, and displays information on direct air support missions. 
6. Maintains friendly and enemy ground situation display necessary to coordinate 
direct air support operations. 
7. Provides direct air support aircraft and other MACCS agencies with 
information concerning the friendly and enemy situation. 
8. Refers unresolved conflicts in supporting arms to the senior FSCC’s fire 
support coordinator (FSC). 
 
C. DASC SKILLS 
All DASC officers and enlisted Marines attend a nine-week school in 29 Palms, 
California.  Upon completion of the school, the officers are designated Air Support 
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Control Officers, and the enlisted are designated Air Support Net Operators.  The nature 
of the DASC requires a close working relationship between the officers and enlisted.  In 
keeping with this, they attend school at the same time and receive a major portion (29 out 
of 34 training days) of the entry-level training together, including working as a crew in a 
progressively more complex simulated combat environment.   
Both officers and enlisted have a career progression model they follow which is a 
succession of required tasks and events based on numerical qualification levels that start 
at 100 and progress to 400. Officers and enlisted leave 29 Palms as ‘Combat Capable’ 
qualified at level 100.  Once the new officers and enlisted arrive at their first duty station, 
they begin the process of achieving the rest of their qualifications. 
Level 200 qualifications for officers, or ‘Combat Ready,’ occurs upon successful 
completion of the requirements for qualification as a Tactical Air Director (for fixed-
wing aircraft) and Helicopter Director.  Level 300, or ‘Combat Qualified’, is achieved 
upon qualification as a Senior Air Director.  The final qualification at level 400, ‘Full 
Combat Qualified,’ occurs at the Marine Corps’ Weapons and Tactics Instructors School 
in Yuma, Arizona.  
The enlisted Marines follow a similar career progression, however once they 
complete their level 300 qualifications  (Fire Support Coordination Net Operator, Tactical 
Air Request/Helicopter Request Net Operator and Tactical Air Control/Direct Air 
Support Net Operator), they start over at level 100 as Crew Chief’s in training. 
 
D. THE FUTURE OF DIRECT AIR SUPPORT: INTERNAL 
ORGANIZATION 
The future of the internal organization of the DASC is as much one of where the 
direct air support function should be located as how it should look internally.  All of 
those interviewed pointed out the dichotomous nature of the DASC in its relationship 
between the Air Combat Element (ACE, the DASC’s boss) and the Ground Combat 
Element (the supported unit).  The DASC responds to the Ground Combat Element 
(GCE) Commander’s requirements for direct air support by processing immediate air 
support requests, coordinating aircraft employment with other supporting arms through 
 34
the GCE’s senior Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC), and directing designated air 
operations. The DASC’s role in direct air support thus provides a crucial linkage between 
the GCE and the ACE, and thus the physical location requires careful consideration of 
both roles.   
When considering location of the DASC the interviewees all acknowledged the 
trend towards physical collocation with the senior FSCC.   
We were as decentralized during the last deployment, during OIF, as 
probably any DASC has ever been.  And that was driven by geography 
and by the organization on the ground…I believe that there is more of a 
natural tendency toward a fusion of fires and air support from the ground 
commander’s perspective… 
 
While this trend towards becoming a part of the FSCC is acknowledged, it is not 
universally agreed upon.  Many of the respondents pointed to the development of 
technology as an impetus for being able to distance the DASC from the FSCC. 
And with data the way it is, it actually shortens the distances between the 
agencies to the point that it doesn’t matter that the DASC is over here, or 
over there, or collocated… 
These interviewees felt that the trend towards integration would bias the DASC towards 
the GCE when applying air assets: 
If we get sucked up by them, there’s no way you can do that [remain 
unbiased].  If you’re a part of them, you want them to succeed.  It’s the 
whole Helsinki Syndrome.  
In fact, several suggested that improvements in technology could reverse the 
trend, putting the DASC closer to the TACC (much further away from the supported 
units) than ever before. 
Because if I can communicate that decision, I don’t need to be that far 
forward.  It’s sort of like electronic collocation…you can virtually 
transmit the decisions of the DASC, if you had good comms 
[communications], from anywhere on the battlefield…you might do them 
at the TACC. 
Views on the future internal organization of the DASC are just as varied as those 
of where it should be located.  Ideas ranged from a matrix-like organizational structure 
spread out on the battlefield with interconnecting nodes providing a redundant network; 
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to a vertically connected system similar to the Army Airspace Command and Control 
made up of increasingly smaller nodes down to the battalion level.  However, what 
everyone interviewed agreed upon was that the current DASC does not have enough 
assets and personnel to provide the air support for a multiple division GCE.  The multiple 
division GCE was used in OIF and, in fact, is built into most of the existing operations 
plans.  As one senior officer put it:  
I think they [the DASC] are going to reorganize because there are people 
that think we need to reorganize.  The reason I don’t like it is, if you have 
an Air Command and Control Battalion that has all those functions that we 
currently know as MASS, LAAD…all those functions falling under one 
flag, one unit, there isn’t enough of any one function to field a capability 
that is big enough for a major theater war. 
What this alludes to is that the MASS is designed, in strength and equipment, to support 
the Marine Expeditionary Force, which contains one division-sized ground combat force.  
In several operations plans and in OIF, the MASS had to field a DASC capable of 
supporting multiple ground combat elements.  This interviewee, and two others, noted 
that simply reorganizing would not solve a manning or insufficient equipment problem if 
the battles of the future are going to be fought in the same way. 
 
E. THE FUTURE OF DIRECT AIR SUPPORT:  PROCESSES 
What almost all of the interviewees did agree on was the critical processes the 
DASC will need to be able function effectively in the future.  Ten out of the twelve 
indicated that the current Mission Essential Task List would continue to be valid.  In 
addition to those critical functions, some new ones have emerged that were identified as 
being equally critical. 
Interoperability was a common theme, both within the MACCS and with external 
agencies.  For most of the junior officers and enlisted that were interviewed OIF was the 
first time they interacted with a fully deployed MACCS and with Joint Assets.  This lack 
of previous experience highlighted some of the new processes critical to future air 
support such as greater interaction with the UAV squadron in conducting immediate 
requests for aerial reconnaissance, integration with Special Operations, and coordinating 
real-time information from airborne sensor platforms like the Joint Surveillance Target 
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Attack System.  All three of these new processes elevated a previously rarely used 
function to become a defining feature of the DASC – Type III Close Air Support (CAS). 
Type III CAS is conducted when the terminal controller (usually a qualified 
Forward Air Controller) cannot visually see the target or the aircraft.  Traditionally this 
was the result of the FAC coming under fire after identifying the target and conditions 
preventing him from positively identifying the friendly aircraft and confirming that the 
aircraft is about to drop his ordnance on the correct target instead of the friendly unit.  
This positive assurance can be waived in Type III CAS when the FAC determines that 
some other factor will help prevent fratricide.  This factor is usually geographical (i.e. a 
river separates the friendly from the enemy units).  During OIF, the DASC found itself 
using satellite imagery to talk aircraft onto known targets that could not be seen by the 
FACs.  These targets were beyond the range of the forward unit’s weapon systems, but 
posed in imminent threat.  Using the intelligence developed by the Division, the DASC 
was able to task aircraft with these targets.  This process was somewhat new to the 
DASC, but became very important to the Division. 
 
F. THE FUTURE OF DIRECT AIR SUPPORT: SKILLS 
Perhaps not surprisingly, all of the interviewees were confident that the function 
of direct air support is not going to disappear in the future no matter how sophisticated 
the tactical data systems.  One officer summed it up best:  
I don’t think the air support function is going anywhere.  I believe that as 
long as there is a Marine on the ground, and an airplane in the sky, there is 
going to be an interface that has to be provided. 
What was unexpected was the resistance found to changing the individual skills required 
to operate in the DASC.  While all of the interviewees acknowledged the role that IT was 
playing in changing the physical layout and functions of the DASC, less than a third were 
able to identify any specific changes in training that needed to occur.  A senior Marine 
put it this way, “I don’t think it [IT] fundamentally changes what they have to do…I think 
it will support the existing decision-making process, just with more information.” 
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 The dominant view was that IT in the DASC should be used as a Decision 
Support Tool, where the operator still relies primarily on his/her judgment in receiving, 
coordinating and processing the immediate air support requests.  This view is apparently 
more a result of having little to no confidence in the IT systems that are currently fielded 
than resistance to change.  However, all of the interviewees did express the opinion that 
training on the existing systems needed to be dramatically improved.  They contended 
that, “the most pressing need is immediately being able to incorporate not only 
transformational systems…but to really get competent with the use of the systems that we 
have.”  In addition, this emphasis on the need for more training on existing systems did 
not stop at the DASC’s tent door:  
Yes it is confidence in the system.  Yes, it is ‘the system is only as good as 
the input going into it’.  So I wouldn’t say it’s just an air support problem, 
certainly not just a MASS problem.  I think it’s a Marine Corps problem, 
that we are only taking advantage of 50% of the capability of any system.  
And that’s probably a very high estimate. 
The Operational definition that was developed during this research may seem 
somewhat ambiguous.  The DASC may locate with the Division in the future, or not.  It 
probably does not need to redefine its current list of critical tasks, but a few more have 
been added.  Despite adding these tasks there is very little to be done in the way of 
adding or changing the skill sets of DASC personnel beyond systems proficiency 
training.   This version of the future DASC is thus basically the same as it is today, with 
the ability to process more information, faster, from just about anywhere on the 
battlefield.  Given this definition what did the DASC’s IT infrastructure look like during 
OIF, and was it sufficient to support a transformed operating environment?  The next 






V. DASC IT INFRASTRUCTURE AND PROCESSES DURING 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
Initial anecdotal reports from Operation Iraqi Freedom indicated that neither 
TBMCS nor AFATDS were utilized as planned.  Whether it was due to systems 
interoperability failures or incongruence in fit between the tasks required of the DASC 
and the technology, or a combination of both, will be explored in this chapter.  However, 
the more critical product of a study of Iraqi Freedom is the analysis of those systems that 
were used and how they enabled the DASC to accomplish its mission.  By identifying 
those aspects of the systems and procedures that worked well in the type of dynamic 
warfare seen in Iraq, recommendations can be derived for the development of future 
systems based on a concurrent analysis of the requirements of transformation.  This 
chapter will first decompose the DASC processes into critical data flows internal and 
external to the DASC.  Then, in the Systems Analysis section, a description of the DASC 
internal IT architecture will be matched to the data flows to identify the weaknesses in 
the supporting architecture. 
 
A. DASC DATA FLOW 
Description of the data flow within the DASC is accomplished using Data Flow 
Diagrams developed as a result of interviews with the Marines who were in the DASC 
during Iraqi Freedom. A Context Diagram, called a Level Zero diagram, shows all of the 
inputs and outputs to the system (Kowal, 1988).  In the Context Diagram, squares 
represent agencies internal to the DASC, circles represent the process being described 
and arrows identify specific inputs and outputs from the process.  A bi-directional arrow 
indicates a dialogue while unidirectional arrows represent a one-way flow of data.  
Following the Context Diagram is a Level One diagram, which breaks the system down 
into a series of functional processes.  Level One begins to show how information 
logically flows through the system.  Level Two further decomposes the functional 
processes to describe how each of them generates the outputs that it does.  For purposes 
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of this paper, the only relevant processes in the DASC will be decomposed to Level 2.  
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Figure 9.   DASC Context Diagram (Level 0) 
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 The intent of this Context Diagram is not to overwhelm the reader, rather to show 
the incredible complexity involved in the coordination and execution of direct air 
support.  Nor is it needlessly large.  In fact, the agencies listed here as external to the 
DASC, and the information inputs and outputs that connect them, are not the sum total of 
data flow sources for the DASC.  For example, aircraft missions can range from 
preplanned (missions have been planned and take off at a given time), to preplanned on-
call (missions have been planned but are event driven vice time-driven) to immediate 
(aircraft ready to perform general unplanned missions available either on the ground in 
alert status or circling over the battlefield).  Also, the types of requests can be divided 
into requests for close air support, medical evacuation, surveillance and reconnaissance, 
resupply, troop movement or even battlefield illumination.  Agencies external to the 
DASC can also include medical units, electronic warfare units and combat service 
support units.  However, due to the scope of this project, only the primary agencies and 
critical information items needed for the DASC to perform its mission are shown and 













The DASC controls and directs air support activities affecting the GCE 
commander's focus on close operations and those air missions requiring 
integration with the ground combat forces (close air support, assault support, 
and designated air reconnaissance). The FSCC will make decisions in all cases 
of conflicting requests for fire support assets. The FSCC provides the DASC 
with updates to unit boundaries and fire support coordination measures, friendly 
and enemy unit positions, pertinent intelligence data, and other prearranged data 
items as they are received at the FSCC. The DASC is responsible to the FSCC 
to provide timely information on— BDAs, Status of outstanding requests, 
pertinent intelligence data, delays or cancellations to the ATO, status of ongoing 





Any unit on the battlefield may request immediate air support from the DASC.  
Units the DASC is typically in contact with provide the DASC with their current 
locations and generate immediate air support requests.  Requests are assigned a 
request number by the DASC and approved requests are sent back to the 
requestor with aircraft mission numbers assigned to them.  When a mission is 
completed any observations regarding battle damage assessment from the pilots 






Joint assets exist that conduct a variety of missions involving command and 
control of the airspace around the Marine’s and the control of excess joint air 
support assets.  During OIF, the DASC would request additional aircraft when 
the ATO did not provide enough form these assets.  In addition, radar aircraft, 
such as JSTARS, were sometimes used to provide positive locations for both 
enemy and friendly units.  Joint aircraft were received from, and then returned 
to, these assets. 
Aircraft 
Assigned to the 
DASC 
All aircraft assigned to the DASC are required to radio in when they arrive in 
the DASC’s area, and radio out when leaving. Aircrews relay their intentions, 
radioing the DASC at their designated contact point,  respond to the DASC’s 
routing/control, and provide accurate position/location information. The DASC 
updates aircrew on the most recent changes to enemy and friendly unit 
positions, threats to the aircrew and their assigned mission.  When radioing out 




The DASC relies on the UAV squadron to keep it updated on the current 
location of all UAVs flying in the DASC’s airspace.  The DASC passes all 






Marines use FARPs to stage both fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft closer to 
the main battle area to shorten reaction and turnaround time.  The DASC relays 
launch orders to alert aircraft at the FARPS and can verify the locations of 






  The CJFLCC is ultimately responsible for distributing the information 
necessary to maintain the location and disposition of friendly and threat ground, 
air and maritime units within the designated battle space.   This data, when 
compiled and correlated to ensure accuracy forms the Common Tactical Picture 
and is distributed across the battlefield.  Individual units are given permission to 





The TACC is the DASC’s senior agency.   The TACC authority to the  DASC to 
divert airborne assets to missions with higher priority as coordinated/approved 
by the senior FSCC and to launch on-call CAS aircraft. This serves to ensure 
minimum response time to the MAGTF’s direct air support requirements. The 
TACC responds to the DASC’s requests to fill the GCE’s needs for additional 
direct air support. The DASC keeps the TACC informed on the progress of 
direct air support missions, the effectiveness of the OAS effort, and the friendly 
and enemy air/ground situation. The DASC passes all combat information 
received from other sources to the TACC. 
Artillery 
Regiment 
The DASC maintained a unique relationship with the Marine’s artillery 
regiment during Iraqi Freedom. The regiment provided the DASC with 
information on gun positions; gun-target lines; and gun trajectories near aircraft 
flight routes.  It also played a major role in generating immediate air requests to 
prosecute enemy artillery and mortar units found via Counter-Battery Radar. 
    
Table 1.   DASC Contextual Diagram Data Dictionary 
 
Now that the major inputs to and outputs from the DASC have been identified, a 
Level One diagram can be used to define the data flow internal to the DASC.  Beginning 
with the Level One diagram, data stores will begin to appear.  According to Kowal a data 
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store, “is a time-delayed repository of data” (Kowal, 1988).  Taken loosely this definition 
can be applied to a form, or even a database.  Table 2 identifies the data stores and their 
descriptions found in the Level One and Level Two Diagrams.  Within the diagrams, a 
data store is identified by its name with a line above and below it. 
 
Data Store Description 
Automated Deep Operations 
Coordination System (ADOCS) 
Employed as the Combined Joint Forces Land Component 
Commanders common tactical picture, ADOCS is a situation 
awareness tool that integrates a broad number and type of 
C4ISR systems.  The DASC primarily used it for its mapping 
capabilities to determine the location of designated “No 
Strike” targets in relation to target locations. 
Advanced Field Artillery 
Tactical Data System (AFATDS) 
AFATDS provides automated functions including: fire 
support planning, execution of commander's guidance, fire 
mission processing, coordination and clearance of fires, 
submission and receipt of Air Support Requests and Air 
Tasking Orders, and target intelligence processing.  
Airspace Control Order A document describing all approved airspace control measures covering a 24-hour period. 
Air Tasking Order 
A document disseminated by the Combined Joint Forces Air 
Component Commander to components, subordinate units, 
and command and control agencies which details projected 
sorties and assigns them to targets and specific missions. The 
ATO normally provides specific instructions to include call 
signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general 
instructions for all sorties. 
JTAR/ASR/MEDEVAC/JTASR 
These represent the four basic types of requests the DASC can 
process.  Each request has its own unique form allowing for 
ease of readability and use (i.e. the Assault Support Request 
has blocks for pick-up and drop-off coordinates, while the 
Joint Tactical Airstrike Request does not).  All forms will 
contain some common items such as time received, mission 
location, mission numbers, type and number of aircraft 
assigned, the coordination conducted in support of the request, 
and the time mission data is sent back to the requesting unit. 
Main Map Board 
The map board actually consists of three boards, each helping 
to maintain the DASC crew’s situational awareness of the 
status of the land and air battle.  The Map Board is described 
in detail in the Systems Analysis section of this Chapter. 
 
Table 2.   DASC Data Store Dictionary 
 
As shown in Chapter V, the DASC performs many tasks, but they can be divided 
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Figure 10.   DASC Level One Diagram 
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 The four main critical processes that occur within the DASC and their function are 
explained in Table 3. 
 
Process Description 
Receive, Coordinate and Process 
Immediate Air Support Requests
Air Support Net Operators receive requests for air support that 
are transcribed onto request forms. Request numbers are 
assigned by the DASC and checked against the common 
tactical picture for accuracy.  The requests are coordinated 
with external agencies for correct weapons-target pairing or 
when the request requires external agency approval. The 
coordinated request then enters the Assign Aircraft process for 
approval.  Approved/Disapproved requests are sent back to 
the requestor with the mission data of the assigned aircraft on 
approved requests.   Mission Data is also globally updated on 
the Air Tasking Order.  Completed requests contain the results 
of the mission and that information is used to update the 
common tactical picture and all relevant external agencies. 
Assign Aircraft 
Aircraft assignment begins with the reading of mission 
information from the request form and check of available 
aircraft for suitability.  Insufficient aircraft generates an 
external request for more.  If appropriate assets are found their 
mission data form the ATO is transcribed onto the request 
form and sent back to into the Receive, Coordinate and 
Process Immediate Air Support Requests function. 
Maintain Common Tactical 
Picture 
Maintaining the Common Tactical Picture for the DASC is a 
process of coordinating information that has been both pushed 
to and pulled from external agencies into a coherent map of 
the battlefield that includes friendly and enemy unit positions, 
fire support unit status (firing/nonfiring and their targets) and 
battlefield geometry.  This common tactical picture is used to 
make decisions in the other three DASC processes. 
Procedurally Control Aircraft 
Air Support Control Officers control fixed-wing and rotary 
wing aircraft, UAVs and designated electronic warfare and air 
reconnaissance aircraft.  They coordinate the employment of 
aircraft with the fire support assets on the battlefield.  They 
brief aircrew on their assigned missions and the portions of 
the common tactical picture relevant to their assigned 
missions.  They control aircraft by giving them directions to 
and from a target area based on a series of published 
procedural control points and the threat to the aircraft.   
 
Table 3.   DASC Level One Diagram Data Dictionary 
 
In order to coordinate and process immediate air support requests, assign aircraft 
and procedurally control those aircraft it is vital that the DASC maintain an accurate, near 
real time, tactical picture of the battlefield.  This tactical picture must have enough detail 
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that a Helicopter Director can safely maneuver his aircraft around threats and active fire 
support assets.  At the same time, the tactical picture in the DASC must maintain the 
flexibility for the Tactical Air Director to brief fast moving fixed-wing aircraft on only 
those pieces relevant to their mission.  The tactical picture must be verifiable, 
unambiguous and readable by everyone in the DASC.  It contains the sum total of 
everything the DASC knows about the current locations of all friendly and enemy units 
within the DASC’s area of responsibility, the current fire support and air control 
measures, the current immediate air requests that air being processed, and the status of all 
aircraft assigned to the DASC within a given time window.  The Level Two diagram for 
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Figure 11.   DASC Common Tactical Picture Level Two Diagram 
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Most of this information is displayed one end of a DASC shelter on a main map 
board with two “frag” boards to either side.  The frag boards display status of the 
DASC’s fixed wing aircraft on one, and rotary-wing aircraft on the other.  The main map 
board contains a topographical map of the DASC’s area of responsibility.  Icons are used 
to display the current known positions of all enemy and friendly units and the locations of 
current requests by type (troop lift, etc).  All active fire support and airspace coordination 
measures (including the procedural control points) are placed on the map via overlays.  
Current known surface to air threats and their estimated threat range rings are also drawn 
on the map.   As can be seen from the diagram, there are several instances where data 
flow seems to be duplicated and originates from different locations.  This was due 
entirely to the manner in which the IT architecture was implemented and used during 
Iraqi Freedom, and is the topic of the next section. 
 
B. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
Kowal states that, “Before we can propose alternatives to a system that would 
either alleviate some problem…or provide some desired feature or enhancement, we must 
clearly understand the existing problem” (1988).  In order to do this Kowal suggests that 
the physical model created above can be logically analyzed in terms of inputs and outputs 
to identify any weaknesses or redundancies in the system.   By taking a look back at the 
Level Two diagram these redundancies begin to become apparent. 
As described in Table 2, the DASC has a number of tactical data systems that are 
designed to provide it with a common tactical picture similar to the one displayed on the 
main map board.  In fact, the DASC has experimented with using projection screens with 
projectors to display the common tactical picture in place of the current map board.  
However, another look at the Level Two diagram will show the same data flow coming 
from these systems is being duplicated and coordinated prior to becoming a ‘DASC 
Tactical Picture.’  For example, inputs to process 3.4, Coordinate Fire Support Tactical 
Picture, include Fire Support Coordination Measures generated within the system from 
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AFATDS and external to the system (from 1st Marine Division on the Contextual 
Diagram).  The reason for this duplication, as one Marine put it: 
[We] would receive up to 40 geometries every 5 minutes, we would have 
to figure out which ones would relate to our AOR [Area of 
Responsibility], most of the time we would have the Division ASLT [Air 
Support Liaison Team, DASC personnel assigned to the 1st Marine 
Division Fire Support Coordination Center as liaisons] ask the FSCC what 
FSCMs are important then the ASLT would tell me, I would pull them up 
and write down the grids and much of the time the grids wouldn’t match 
between AFATDS and what the ASLT could get for us. 
When asked what the DASC would do when it found the grid coordinates for fire support 
coordination measures received from AFATDS did not match those provided by the 
ASLT, the operator replied, “After a couple of times we stopped using the AFATDS 
FSCMs except as a last resort.  When we would go get our friendly updates we would get 
the FSCM changes as well.”  The operator’s mention of getting friendly updates 
additionally refers to relying on the ASLT to provide the ground common tactical picture 
vice relying on the common tactical picture provided by ADOCS or TBMCS.  
 The question becomes, where is the disconnect between tactical data system 
capability and its actual use coming from?  A senior officer described the situation in the 
DASC today: 
And again that becomes a friction point, taking an existing level of 
personnel and training level in the operating forces, what I have on hand 
today, and bring in any system, the greatest system in the world, without 
adequate training, without an adequate understanding of its 
transformational purpose, and without the acceptance of it as a 
transformational tool…Lay it into the existing organization that we have 
today and we will invariably throw out the baby with the bathwater. 
In every instance on the Level Two diagram where a data flow is duplicated the 
DASC found itself coordinating incongruencies between two or more methods of 
receiving the same data.  The reason behind relying on the ASLTs (located throughout 
the battlefield at regiment-sized units and above) was the perception of the DASC that 
they could not rely on the tactical data systems to provide them accurate information.  As 
one senior officer commented:  
We still have systems, not the greatest systems in the world, we have 
systems that are feeding us information, whether you’re talking C2PC, or 
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ADOCS, or Blue Force Tracker, we have any number providers or sources 
of information, but no trust or confidence in any one of them to be the 
total answer. 
So, the DASC reacted to the inability of the tactical data systems to generate an accurate 
common tactical picture by coordinating their own ‘DASC Common Tactical Picture’ 
that it would use in support of the other three major internal processes.  All information 
entering the system was checked against other information for correlation before being 
placed onto the main map board. 
 However, not blaming the systems for the inaccuracy or unsuitability of 
information input to the DASC was a common theme found in the interviews.  In fact, all 
but one of the interviewees agreed that the problem was not necessarily the systems 
themselves, but the level of training on them across the entire Marine Corps.  The same 
senior officer said: 
We take a system that is designed in somewhat of a conceptual, forward-
leaning state, and we throw it into existing organizations and processes 
without adequate training, without an understanding of exactly what it’s 
supposed to do and almost use the system to force reorganization.  I think 
the most pressing need is immediately being able to incorporate not only 
transformational systems, although many of the automated systems we 
have today are somewhat transformational in their own nature, but to 
really get competent with the use of the systems that we have. 
And this perception exists not only at the management level, but with the operators as 
well.  An enlisted instructor of one of the systems noted that the level of training required 
to make the systems useful to the DASC was not being conducted: 
Like right now, since we’ve been back I haven’t heard one person talk 
about going to go train on TBMCS.  Yet we have half a dozen brand new 
PFCs [Privates First Class, a junior Marine with less than 9 months in the 
Marine Corps] here.  I haven’t heard one person say a word about it.  We 
may have a handful of Corporals and Sergeants that can do it, but they’re 
not going to be around forever.  In fact, you see a lot of them heading out 
the door.  And, it has to be a continuous process; the sustainment training 
just isn’t there for those systems.  They’re constantly being modified, and 
if you don’t keep that up, it’s obviously something that’s perishable.  
Especially even those that do have the skills still have to sustain their 
training and it doesn’t happen; with any of those systems. 
Despite the caveats provided by the DASC personnel regarding training 
throughout the Marine Corps, “I wouldn’t say it’s just an air support problem, certainly 
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not just a MASS problem. I think it’s a Marine Corps problem, that we are only taking 
advantage of 50% of the capability of any system.  And that’s probably a very high 
estimate,” there does seem to be recognition of interoperability problems within the 
DASC’s internal IT architecture.  One example is the noted deficiency in regards to gun 
to target lines (GTLs).   
GTLs involve the drawing of a line from a fire support unit to a target it is 
currently firing on.  The GTL includes a time or duration of firing and the expected 
maximum altitude the ordnance will reach in its trajectory.  Knowing the real-time 
location of GTLs is important for the Air Support Control Officers to know when routing 
aircraft through the area.  AFATDS is capable of generating GTLs that the DASC can 
use, but only if all of the AFATDS terminals from the firing battery through its battalion, 
regiment and the Division are set up correctly.  This requires training several dozen 
Marines, who do not work for the DASC, on how to set up their terminals to best benefit 
the DASC.  In addition, the GTLs generated by AFATDS are internal to the AFATDS 
software and cannot be exported to other systems.  Since AFATDS is not meant to be a 
displayer of the Common Tactical Picture it often has a highly inaccurate picture of the 
current situation displayed on its map, therefore the GTLs (when they are displayed) 
become useless. 
The relative lack of quality training, combined with systems that have not reached 
their incremental interoperability objectives, posed a conundrum for the DASC during 
Iraqi Freedom.   
Whatever the source of the information, whatever the system that inputs 
the information…to then transmit [the information] via C2PC, or via 
ADOCS, or via any other system…I don’t really see that as where we 
need to be in order to have the confidence in the picture as it’s being 
displayed...The incorporation of that automated input into our decision 
making process, we’re not doing that very well.  We didn’t do it very well 
during OIF and until something that really proves itself comes along, I 
don’t see us getting much better at it. 
Whether the apparent disconnect between user needs and IT capabilities is at a critical 
level, depends on who you are, and where you sit with respect to the DASC.  Now that all 
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four domains of the Strategic Alignment Model have been described in terms of the 
DASC, the next chapter examines the perspectives on alignment found within the sample 












VI. ANALYSIS OF THE DASC STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT 
MODEL 
The interviews conducted in support of this portion of the research included four 
senior officers (major and above) and two senior enlisted (gunnery sergeant and above) 
with a combined total of over 100 years in the Marine Corps.  Their current billets placed 
half of them working directly within the DASC during Iraqi Freedom and the other half 
external to the DASC but still within the MACCS.  These six Marines were asked 
questions related to their perception of the strategic alignment of the DASC.  
After explaining the domains of the Strategic Alignment Model and how it relates 
to the MACCS and DASC, the interviewees were asked a series of questions about the 
relative strengths of the domains.  First, they were asked which domain was the weakest, 
or in most critical need of change.  Once that domain was identified, they were then 
asked which of the remaining domains was the strongest, or would drive the changes 
needed in the weakest domain.  Finally, they were asked which of the two remaining 
domains would be most affected by making a change in the weakest domain.   
By following this method, the author was able to code the interviews by 
identifying the Domain Anchor (strongest), Domain Pivot (weakest), and the Impact 
Domain (most affected) and analyze the perceptions defined by Henderson and 
Venkatraman, and Papp and Luftman, which resulted from their responses.  These 
perspectives are presented along with their anticipated impact on the DASC.  The final 
chapter will analyze the enablers and inhibitors to achieving strategic alignment found in 
the DASC and its impact on future development. 
 
A. PERSPECTIVES AND THEIR MEANINGS 
Among the six interviews, 50% identified the Competitive Potential perspective 
as their view towards achieving alignment in the DASC.  Two of the remaining three 
interviewees identified the Organizational Infrastructure perspective and one identified 
the Technology Transformation perspective.  The relative frequency with which a 
perspective was found should not be taken as an indication of central tendency, or the 
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‘right’ perspective.  It is entirely possible that multiple perspectives are necessary to 
obtain a complete, accurate and effective view of an implementation.  Moreover, even if 
one wanted to obtain a measure of central tendency in perspectives, the sample of 
interviewees was too small to draw any statistical inferences.  Hence, each perspective 
will be given equal consideration in its meaning for the DASC. 
1. Competitive Potential 
Competitive potential involves the recognition by an organization that its strength 
lies in its technological superiority in some facet.  Using this superiority to its advantage 
the organization adjusts its business model to take full advantage of the edge given by its 
technology, which affects the way it conducts business on a day-to-day basis.  From this 
perspective, new or emerging technology is used to define what an organization is to 
become and then decide how to utilize that technology.  
The interviewees who identified with this perspective indicated that the MACCS 
business strategy was the weakest domain.  Despite the publication of the MACCS 
Concept Papers, the common perception was that actual change had yet to occur.  The 
emphasis was placed on not just defining, but also actually repositioning the MACCS 
business strategy because: 
What’s more important to me…and probably what’s more important to the 
Marine Corps as an institution is the external function.  Because, the 
internal has pretty specific, although important, functions.  But in totality, 
with one being subordinate to the other, I think that it’s more important to 
have your MACCS and your external [IT] functions lined up first. 
The driver of change to the MACCS strategy was seen as the available technology 
and how to employ it.  Allowing IT Strategy to drive business strategy was not seen as 
reactionary by the interviewees.  In fact, they felt that the MACCS could be proactive.   
“What we should be doing is having a little more foresight to say, ‘this is what’s coming 
down the road,’ and jumping ahead and starting to reorganize to take on the technology 
as it comes in and be ready for it.” 
The result of a refined business strategy that takes advantage of emerging 
technology is a change in the internal processes that execute the business strategy.  In 
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terms of the MACCS, this means that tomorrow’s direct air support function may or may 
not look anything like today’s DASC.   
I think the biggest change will happen in the air support function side.  All 
those functions that we group today in one facility, in one center, are 
going to become distributed, and regrouped with other functions from 
other agencies as driven by operational requirements.  So they’ll be 
different every time.  On one operation or exercise you may get a grouping 
that’s laid out on the battlefield a certain way, because of the mission 
requirements that are there.  And then the next thing that you go to could 
be completely different. 
While this may not be what the DASC will look like, once the MACCS allows itself to 
adapt to employ IT to its best advantage, then it can study how much business process 
reengineering needs to occur to support the new strategy.  
2. Technology Transformation 
This perspective tries to optimize the internal IT infrastructure by changing the IT 
strategy to better align with the overall business strategy.  It is pursued by organizations 
that have identified an IT strategy through the development of their business strategy.  
This IT strategy is then used to design and create a system that supports it.  Thus the 
business strategy, which identifies areas in which an organization plans to excel, defines 
the IT strategy to support those areas, leading to the design of an IT infrastructure that 
supports the business strategy.  
Although not identified specifically by more than one interviewee as the weakest 
area, three out of the six did note a deficiency in the IT Strategy domain.  Comments in 
this area focused on the perceived lack of an overall IT strategy: 
What is lacking is…we have a whole lot of systems out there…we have 
AFATDS, we have ADOCS, we have TBMCS, we have C2PC, you know, 
the list goes on and on.  In the TACC center they have at least 4 more.  
What is lacking, and I think what has been lacking, is an information 
management plan, as to what information goes over what system, and 
how, and to who, and more importantly, why.  There’s a danger, I think, 
and I’ve seen it, in too much information available. 
The Technology Transformation Perspective sees the role of the IT manager as an 
enabler of a strong business strategy.  “I think that the Concept of Employment should 
always drive the material solution, be it IT or hardware or facilities or whatever.”  In this 
case, the drivers of change are the top managers within the MACCS.  In order to 
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effectively enable the IT strategy, these managers must understand the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of their current architecture.  They also need to be able to articulate to 
the IT manager how technology should be applied (i.e. for automation of direct air 
support requests). 
Once the IT strategy has been revised to best support the Business strategy, the 
impacted domain is the Internal IT Infrastructure.  The internal IT infrastructure 
undergoes its own reorganization as decisions to purchase new systems and continue to 
employ legacy systems become aligned with the Business and IT strategies.  
It should drive some of the change in the internal architecture, but it 
should not drive a change in processes and skills.  There might be some 
processes that can be streamlined because of IT that meets our needs better 
than it does now.  Maybe “X” process in the air support function can be 
streamlined because the IT available in the years to come is better, more 
user friendly, more dynamic than what I think it is right now. 
3. Organizational Infrastructure 
The organizational infrastructure strategy occurs when the results of a business 
reengineering process are used to define the corporate strategy, which leads to the 
adoption of a new IT strategy.  The two interviewees who identified with the 
Organizational Infrastructure perspective felt strongly that change had to be driven 
internally from within the functions of the MACCS:  
I think the most effective change is going to be driven from below, 
because it just seems to be…we got an elephant we have to eat.  If we’re 
going to transform the MACCS and transform the Marine Corps, we’ve 
got to eat it all, and we’ve got to eat it in bite-sized chunks.  I believe 
those are better addressed at the functional level from both the IT 
perspective as well as the process and organization perspective.  And then 
the end result of that low level transformation becomes a transformation of 
the entity. 
The Organizational Infrastructure perspective relies on first determining what are 
a businesses core functions and processes, and then adapting the external business 
strategy to maximize the leverage provided by those critical functions. Functions like 
direct air support should be solidly defined and then used to guide the MACCS Business 
strategy.  The two interviewees who identified with this perspective saw the internal 
functions driving this change in strategy, “because we’ve got to get from where we are 
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today, to where you can match different functions throughout the MACCS to form nodes, 
and those sorts of things, that better support the mission and the capabilities of the 
technology that is there.” 
As with the Technology Transformation perspective, the interviewees who 
identified with the Organizational Infrastructure see the existence of a strong MACCS 
Business strategy as having an immediate effect on the MACCS IT strategy.  However, in 
this perspective the MACCS Business strategy is considered the weakest domain, with a 
change making an impact on the overall IT strategy.  Until the MACCS redefines itself, 
the IT strategy cannot progress.  “It’s kind of hard to transform how you would like to do 
things, or how you want to do things, when you’re continually tied back to how you have 
to do things today.” 
 
B. THE IMPACT OF MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES 
The existence of multiple perspectives among the senior leadership may seem to 
cause problems as the MACCS and DASC are redefined (or not) in accordance with the 
Transformation objectives.  The goal of the Strategic Alignment Model is to allow 
executives to select the perspective that best reflects their “business conditions and 
organizational objectives” (Henderson & Venkatraman, 1993).  The selection of a 
perspective often depends on where you sit in relation to the four domains.  For example, 
if the interviewee’s job was to develop the MACCS IT strategy, the model predicts (s)he 
would probably take the Competitive Potential perspective and would see IT strategy as 
driving the Business strategy to redefine the Organizational infrastructure. 
The multiple perspectives, then, only indicate that the leadership is viewing the 
lack of alignment from different frames of reference.  Each of the interviewees was 
distinct in their roles by virtue of different ranks or holding different billets within the 
MACCS and DASC.  These different perspectives help to keep the senior leadership from 
becoming too focused on one type of alignment and neglecting the overall process.   
In fact, Henderson and Venkatraman indicate that the only way to strengthen a 
diagonal link in the model is for senior management to fully understand the two 
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perspectives that create change in the Impacted Domain from the Anchor Domain.  This 
would require a change in two Pivot Domains, which can only be accomplished by the 
senior leadership responsible for those domains.  To truly create alignment between 
business and IT strategy in the DASC will require an acknowledgement on the part of the 
MACCS senior leadership that these different perspectives exist, and an understanding of 















VII. ACHIEVING STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT IN THE DASC 
 The basic premise of strategic alignment is that there should be a balance among 
the four domains.  There should be a strategic integration between external business 
strategy and IT strategy, as well as an operational integration between the organizational 
infrastructure and the supporting IT architecture.  And, of course, there must a functional 
integration between the external business strategy and internal organization, and the IT 
strategy and IT infrastructure.  A lack of congruence in fit between the strategic, 
operational and functional integration exposes an organization to a higher level of 
business risk (risk of failure).   
 On the battlefield, as in the business world, a certain level of risk must be 
accepted.  However, risk that can be mitigated without loss of operational effectiveness 
should be reduced after careful consideration of the costs and benefits.  In this 
perspective, the mitigation of risks becomes removal of the barriers to strategic 
alignment.  This can be accomplished by maximizing alignment enablers and minimizing 
inhibitors as Luftman and Brier suggest (1999).  In an extension of the 1992-1994 study 
that produced the additional four perspectives detailed in Chapter II, Luftman and Brier 
surveyed 500+ firms at IBM’s Advanced Business Institute.  The results of this survey 
identified 12 enablers and inhibitors to alignment as shown in Table 4. 
 ENABLERS  INHIBITORS 
 Senior Executive Support for IT  IT/Business Lack Close Relationships 
 IT Involved in Strategy Development  IT Does Not Prioritize Well 
 IT Understands the Business  IT Fails to Meet its Commitments 
 Business/IT Partnership  IT Does not Understand Business 
 Well Prioritized IT Projects  Senior Executives Do Not Support IT 
 IT Demonstrates Leadership  IT Management Lacks Leadership 
 
Table 4.   Enablers and Inhibitors to Strategic Alignment (After: Luftman & Brier, 1999) 
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  During the research interviews for this case the interviewees were also asked 
what they thought were the enablers and inhibitors to alignment in the DASC.  This final 
chapter will outline the inhibitors and enablers identified in the interviews (highlighted in 
Table 4) and map them to the ones identified by Luftman and Brier.  This paper will 
conclude with recommendations for mitigating the effects of the inhibitors and 
strengthening the enablers to strategic alignment in the DASC. 
  
A. INHIBITORS TO ALIGNMENT IN THE DASC  
 When asked the question, “What things do you think hamper the relationship 
between the development of doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures and the 
design and implementation of data systems,” five out of seven interviewees identified a 
lack of training on systems after they were fielded.  Four of the respondents were the 
same senior Marines who provided their perceptions on alignment in the last chapter.  
This is interesting because the lack of training on fielded systems unfortunately highlights 
the inhibitor involving a Lack of Senior Executive Support for IT.   
 As discussed in Chapter V, nearly all of the interviewees felt the current tactical 
data systems were adequate, but that training across the Marine Corps in their 
implementation and use was inadequate.  However, the impetus for training Marines falls 
directly on the shoulders of their leaders.  Granted, there are valid reasons why adequate 
training cannot always occur.  An example would be the fielding of ADOCS only a few 
months prior to its use in the field.  The most common reason identified for the lack of 
training was that the operational tempo within the DASC precluded sending more than a 
few Marines at a time to schools for instruction.  On top of that, the schools that are 
available rarely focus on the specific needs of integrating the systems within the DASC 
into an automated direct air support tool.  In fact, there currently are no schools that 
provide this level of training.  So the DASC has found itself with, “a handful of Corporals 
and Sergeants that can do it, but they’re not going to be around forever.” 
 The other major inhibitor identified in the interviews was the perceived weak 
relationship between the IT designers and implementers and the operating forces.  This 
lack of a close IT/Business Relationship is varyingly attributed to both sides of the 
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relationship.  Some felt that, “the Fleet is very busy, and the same folks that you need to 
talk to, the folks that are developing, acquiring and planning these systems, the people 
that they need to talk to are the folks that are in the field for several months out of the 
year.  And it’s just hard to get a hold of them.”  Others felt that the problem was one of 
functional integration, “So, we’re always at odds.  You have the vision, if you will, being 
bantered in and around the beltway…And then you have the realities of what’s in the 
unit, what’s in the Fleet today, and it’s a tough marriage to get those two together.”  
 The Department of Defense Instruction (DoD 5000.1 The Defense Acquisition 
System) addresses this issue by stating a preference for spiral development in the 
acquisition process.  Spiral development is a process for developing a set of capabilities 
identified by the users within one increment. The system being developed undergoes one 
or more planned increments, leading to a final product.  This requires interaction between 
the user, tester, and developer, providing the user with the best possible capability within 
the increment.   However, as this perspective demonstrates, user has been constrained by 
operational tempo.  In fact, no matter the perspective taken, the four interviewees who 
identified the lack of a close working relationship between Business and IT, pointed out 
that operational tempo was a major factor. 
  
B. ENABLERS 
 One of the primary enablers identified during the interviews was that the IT 
developers and strategists within the Marine Corps tend to understand the business very 
well. “From the perspective of inputs into the systems themselves, the systems 
specifications documents, the threshold requirements, the things that the systems 
themselves want to accomplish.  I believe that the alignment there is probably pretty 
tight.”  This is not an indication of IT designers understanding the tasks and functions of 
the DASC, or vice versa.  Rather, it is the enabling factor created when someone with 
business experience is placed internal to the development process to help translate user 
requirements.  This strength of alignment comes from the Marine Corps’ policy of 
placing Marines with a significant amount of fleet experience into the program offices.  
What the interviews indicated was that when fleet input was sought, recorded, and later 
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verified in the IT development process, it helped greatly that the IT team had a DASC or 
MACCS member who could translate the requirements for the fleet.  However, as noted 
in the Inhibitors section, often the fleet Marines felt their input is not felt in the process, 
either because they were not asked, or were unable to spare the experienced Marines long 
enough to provide meaningful input. 
 Further, some interviewees identified that even with DASC or MACCS personnel 
directly involved in the acquisition process, the results are not always ideal. “They 
[program offices] solicit those opinions from the fleet, but some of them might be too 
senior or they’re in positions where they don’t find themselves sitting in a tactical agency 
often enough during exercises to really know what the Marines face on a day-to-day basis 
while they’re out in the field.  And how they have to do things.”  While it is seen as an 
enabler to have program managers and combat developers who have had specific training 
or experience in the career field of they are they are responsible for, the skills they have 
are seen as perishable.  The longer a Marine has been away from his primary specialty, 




 Operational tempo was seen as the root cause of almost all of the inhibitors found 
during the interviews.  High operational tempo results in a lack of time and qualified 
personnel available for future systems development.  This leads to an inability to: 
produce validated requirements, verify that the requirements match fielded systems, 
develop an integrated concept of employment for new systems, and train on those 
systems. However, when there is a pause in the operational tempo, experience brought by 
qualified DASC or MACCS personnel to the acquisition process can be invaluable.  This 
is especially true when the combat developers have experience in the DASC or MACCS 
and can act as mediators between the users, designers and program mangers.  
 So where does the middle ground lie?  How do we mitigate the effects of 
increasing operational tempo, and simultaneously enable the acquisition community, to 
strengthen the DASC’s strategic alignment?  The answer may be to create an entity that 
 62
can bridge the gap between user needs and fielded technology.  This entity already exists 
in the Transition Task Force (TTF), a group of senior MACCS officers and enlisted 
headed by the commanding officer of Marine Air Control Group 38.  However, as noted 
in Chapter III, the purpose of the TTF is not to develop technology, but to “recommend 
doctrinal and organizational changes” to the MACCS (Hough, 2003), therefore 
significant changes would need to be made to the TTF in order to sanction it to perform 
this expanded role. 
 First, while the recommendation of doctrinal and organizational changes should 
be a part of the TTF’s mission, this may not be the sum total of what it should be doing.  
Our results suggest that an organization like the TTF needs to take a broader role in the 
overall structure of the Strategic Alignment Model.  It should provide the linkages found 
in the center of the Strategic Alignment Model, ensuring that the enablers to alignment 
are identified and strengthened. For example, it should be responsible for identifying the 
specific needs of the DASC in regards to the effective employment of AFATDS.  These 
needs can then be translated into requirements at the MACCS level when combined with 
the needs of any other agencies.  This would have the effect of strengthening the 
MACCS’ IT Strategy.  By focusing on the linkages of the model, the TTF would be able 
to affect all domains nearly simultaneously.  Its correct positioning, then, is not within the 
Business Strategy domain, but as an agent for change external to the model. 
 As shown in this study, strategic alignment requires balancing the external and 
internal business and IT functions.  Therefore, in order for an organization such as the 
TTF to be effective in aligning strategy with IT functions, it must have three things in 
addition to the ability to define the MACCS’ business strategy:  1) the ability to describe 
and analyze the systems in the MACCS in a manner similar to the system’s analysis 
performed in this study, 2) a way of collecting, reviewing and validating the internal 
organization, procedures and user requirements of the MACCS functions separately from 
the existing MACCS agencies, and 3) the authority to influence the Marine Corps’ IT 
strategy, particularly in regards to the MACCS.   
 The TTF is already capable of accomplishing these four tasks to some extent, 
however it lacks the training to conduct the operations and systems analysis required as 
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well is the authority to influence the direction of IT.  To affect these changes it is 
recommended that the membership of the TTF be expanded to include not just 
operational units, but also elements from Marine Corps Systems Command, Marine 
Corps Operational Test & Evaluation Activity and the Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command.  This organizational structure would give the TTF the expertise, 
authority and direct link to the user required to ensure alignment. 
  
D. CONCLUSION 
 The need for strategic alignment between business and IT strategy is clear.  
Without it, the competitive advantage that innovative technology can bring to the 
battlefield can be damaging at worst (through misapplication) or underutilized at a 
minimum (as seen in Operation Iraqi Freedom).  As seen here, there is a perception of 
misalignment in the current acquisition process that fails to take full advantage of 
transformation doctrine and emerging technology. 
 By aligning both the external and internal strategies and functions of the DASC, a 
synergy can be created providing better situational awareness and responsiveness on their 
part.  This would lead to the more efficient application of available IT resources and 
improved processes for receiving and processing immediate air support requests.  One 
way to improve the internal architecture and transform existing organizational 
infrastructure and processes is to look at it from the strategic alignment perspective. 
 However, being able to take any process, procedure or function, and break it 
down via systems analysis to its functional primitives and analyze them for process 
improvements through the introduction or development of supporting IT systems is a 
costly and time consuming process.  Further study would be needed to determine the 
costs and benefits related to improving strategic alignment within the DASC.  It may be 
found that alignment must first occur at a higher level, between the MACCS and the 
Marine Air Ground Task Force, before the issues of the direct air support function can be 
addressed.   
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The expansion of the Transition Task Force’s membership and authority would 
obviously have a far greater impact than on just the DASC.  It would be a new way of 
matching requirements to fielded capabilities within the MACCS.  Further, it has larger 
implications for the Marine Corps as a whole; those also would need to be the subject of 
further study.  Finally, it should be noted that strategic alignment, like the DoD’s 
Transformation, is not a finite process with a specific end goal.  Strategic alignment 
requires continuous reevaluation of the fit between the four domains, identifying the 
current weakest area and the domain to be used to drive a change.  Once balance has been 
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APPENDIX A - INTERNAL DASC ORGANIZATION (MCWP 3-25.5) 
DASC Officer in Charge (OIC) 
The DASC OIC is a commissioned officer not normally assigned to a crew as a 
watchstander.  The DASC OIC is designated by the Marine air support squadron (MASS) 
commanding officer for a specific operation and is responsible for— 
Embarkation and logistics 
Overall conduct of DASC operations 
Configuration of DASC communications 
Coordinating with joint, multinational, and other external agencies as required 
Evaluating and supervising training for the DASC crew 
DASC Staff Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (SNCOIC) 
The DASC SNCOIC is not normally assigned to a crew as a watchstander.  The 
DASC SNCOIC responsibilities include— 
Assisting the DASC OIC as required 
Coordinating the DASC's embarkation and logistics 
Evaluating and supervising training for enlisted crew members 
Accountability of all personnel assigned to the detachment 
Senior Watch Officer (SWO) 
The SWO is normally a senior officer who is not assigned as a crewmember, but 
who is responsible to the commanding officer for— 
Assisting in coordination with joint, multinational, and other external agencies 
Assisting the senior air director (SAD) by providing briefings to visitors and 
coordinating the efforts of the DASC.  
Evaluating and supervising hands-on training for the DASC crew  
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Senior Air Director (SAD) 
The SAD is the commissioned officer who is the most qualified DASC 
watchstander.  The SAD is responsible for— 
Overall functioning of the DASC crew on watch 
Ensuring intelligence information received by the DASC is disseminated to 
appropriate air control, air defense, and supporting arms elements 
Receiving, disseminating, and posting all fire support information in the DASC 
Coordinating with fire support agencies to ensure deconfliction between aircraft 
and supporting arms is accomplished 
Coordinating the efforts of DASC liaison teams and airborne extensions of the 
DASC as required 
Coordinating with agencies external to DASC 
Directing DASC communications restoration priorities and the upkeep of the 
DASC's overall communication status 
Maintaining a log of significant events that occur during the crew's watch 
Ensuring the logs of the tactical air director (TAD) and helicopter director (HD) 
are complete, reviewed for clarity, and properly signed in and out 
Assigning Appropriate A/C to Immediate Air Support Requests 
Crew Chief 
The DASC crew chief, normally a staff noncommissioned officer (SNCO) or 
noncommissioned officer (NCO) and the most qualified enlisted watchstander, is 
responsible to the SAD for— 
Timely and accurate display of all tactical information 
Coordinating communications restoration and the upkeep of communications 
status 
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Maintaining a log of significant events that occur during the crew watch and files 
containing required forms and records 
Ensuring the net operators' logbooks are completed, checked for clarity, and 
properly signed in and out 
Coordinating DASC-internal information flow 
Supervising the enlisted members of the crew 
Tactical Air Director (TAD) 
The TAD is responsible to the SAD for— 
Coordinating and controlling fixed-wing offensive air support (OAS) aircraft, 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and designated assault support, electronic warfare 
(EW), and air reconnaissance aircraft 
Coordinating direct air support missions with fire support assets (naval surface 
fire support, artillery, etc.) 
Briefing aircrew on assigned missions, threat information, and fire support 
coordination measures 
Reviewing requests for fixed-wing aircraft and recommending the most efficient 
use of available assets 
Maintaining status information on all fixed-wing aircraft under the control of the 
DASC or terminal air controllers 
Coordinating with the HD to eliminate scheduling or mission assignment conflicts 
between those missions that involve both fixed- and rotary-wing assets or when more 
than one mission is conducted in the same area 
Advising and directing fixed-wing aircraft as to changes in the air defense 
warning condition and weapons control status 
Maintaining a log and records as appropriate 
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Helicopter Director (HD) 
The HD is responsible to the SAD for— 
Coordinating and controlling helicopters 
Coordinating designated rotary-wing missions with fire support assets 
Briefing aircrew on assigned missions, threat information, and fire support 
coordination measures 
Reviewing requests for helicopters and recommending the most efficient use of 
available rotary-wing assets 
Maintaining status information on all helicopters under control of the DASC or 
terminal controllers 
Coordinating with the TAD to eliminate conflicts between fixed-wing missions 
and helicopter missions 
Coordinating with the assault support coordinator (airborne) (ASC[A]) for control 
of assigned aircraft 
Advising aircrew of the current air defense warning condition and weapons 
control status and directing helicopter actions specific to the particular air defense alert 
condition   
Coordinating with the TAD on helicopter missions conducting close air support 
(CAS) 
Maintaining a log and appropriate records 
Air Support Net Operators 
Air support net operators are usually enlisted personnel who operate the various 
radio nets within the DASC.  They normally include the tactical air request/helicopter 
request net operator, the direct air support net operator, the tactical air traffic control net 
operator (when required), and the tactical air command net operator.  Some net operator 
functions may be combined depending on the DASC's task organization.  Air support net 
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operators are specially trained in air control procedures and terminology.  An air support 
net operator's responsibilities include— 
Knowing net names, frequencies, and types of communications equipment being 
used 
Knowing the call sign, name, and unit location for stations operating on their 
assigned communications net(s) 
Knowing the type of information expected to be transmitted and received on the 
net 
Understanding the forms/records required to record information from or pass 
information on the net 
Understanding the air/ground situation, to include boundaries, control points, and 
control measures necessary to effectively operate and understand information passed on 
the net 
Managing net operations if assigned as a net control station 
Maintaining a log of significant events that occur during the watch 
Understanding and executing the correct info flow within the DASC 
Air Support Plotters 
Air support plotters are normally enlisted personnel who, under the supervision of 
the DASC SAD and crew chief, maintain the situation displays within the DASC.  They 
are specially trained in air control procedures, terminology, and symbology.  Air support 
plotters are responsible for— 
Plotting information directed by DASC supervisory personnel 
Receiving, recording, and disseminating information received over the 
appropriate net(s) 
Communications-Electronics (C-E) Maintenance Coordinator 
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The C-E maintenance coordinator is assigned to the crew to monitor 
communications nets, monitor the status of the DASC's cryptographic instruments, and 
provide liaison with other C-E Marines operating associated C-E equipment. 
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APPENDIX B - FIELD RESEARCH INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Purpose:  The purpose of this interview is to determine your opinions on how 
technology does and should support the MACCS and DASC envisioned in the Marine 
Corps’ Transformation concepts.  I will be using your answers to determine what 
perspective towards Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare's MACCS Concept of Operations 
and the internal organization of the future DASC.  Your answers will also help me to 
identify your views on the development and implementation of C4ISR systems in the 
MACCS and for the direct air support function.  This research will be used to identify a 
pattern, which when applied to a Strategic Alignment Model, can be used to help 
leverage fleet buy-in on the future of air support and C4ISR. (At this point, show them the 
SAM, but not the expected perspectives)  
Agenda:  I will be asking questions about how you view the current state of 
MACCS IT and Employment strategies as well as how the DASC is organized and 
equipped to perform the air support aspect of the Control of Aircraft and Missiles 
Function.  
Expected Nature of Responses:  This is not a multiple-choice test.  There is no 
right answer.  I am looking for your opinions and perspectives on these topics in as much 
detail as you care to provide.  As I ask these questions, if you can think of any specific 
incidents or details of your experiences that will help emphasize your answers, they 
would help a great deal in the case study. 
Extent of Informality and Probing Nature of Follow-up Questions:  While I 
will be asking some specific questions to ensure certain areas of the Strategic Alignment 
Model are covered, I may ask follow-up questions based on your responses to get more 
details.   
Debriefing:  On Friday I will conduct an exit interview at _________ if you are 
interested in attending.  During the debriefing, I will be happy to answer any questions 
about the Strategic Alignment Model and how it will be applied in my research. 
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Notes and Tape Recording:  If it is okay with you, I would like to tape record 
this interview and make some notes during your replies.  This will help me better analyze 
your responses in relation to the model.  Your privacy is guaranteed.  Though I will ask 
some basic questions about your relative position and experience, nothing you say in this 
interview is attributable without your express consent.  If, during analysis, I decide 
something you have said would lose its meaning without an attribution I will contact you 
directly for permission to quote you. 
Pre-existing Questions:  
 Background:  
1. Please state your rank and name. 
2. Briefly describe your career in terms of duty stations and billets 
3. What role did you have during Operation Iraqi Freedom? 
4. Have you held any billets involved with the development of Marine Corps 
transformation doctrine? 
5. Are you familiar with the MACCS Concept papers "MACCS and OMFTS" and 
"MACCS and EMW"? (show the two books) 
6. How would you rate the strength of the relationship between the transformation 
vision and the development of tactical data systems for the MACCS/DASC? 
7. What things do you think need to happen to enable a stronger relationship 
between the development of doctrine and TTPs and the design and 
implementation of data systems? 
8. What things do you think hamper the relationship between the development of 
doctrine and TTPs and the design and implementation of data systems? 
9. Which of the following areas do you feel needs the most immediate attention: the 
role of the MACCS in relation to Marine Corps Transformation, the concept of 
employment for anticipated technology available to the MACCS, the 
reorganization of the MACCS and specifically the direct air support function, or 
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the design and implementation of tactical data systems for the Transformational 
DASC?  (use a modified version of the SAM with these titles) 
10. Based on the answer to the previous question the follow-on question will ask:  
Would any of the other three factors mentioned (show model again) enable or 
drive the change to _____?  (follow up question)  If not, what do you think 
would? 
a. Based again on their answer to question 9, I would ask the interviewee to 
predict what would be most affected by a change to _______? (Again, I 
could be very specific and give them the remaining two choices, or keep it 
general and see if the domain can be inferred form their answers.) 
11. What do think will be the critical processes that will enable direct air support for 
the MACCS in EMW?  (Ask for specifics, i.e. dynamic targeting in real time) 
12. Do you think the MACCS will need to reorganize?  What will the DASC look 
like? 
13. What skills will be required of ASCO/ASNOs in the future?  How will they be 
different/the same as today? 
14. What positions were manned within the Division Main DASC during OIF? 
15. What positions did you hold? (write them down) 
16. For position  A whom did you communicate with external to the DASC? (write 
them down) 
17. For agency/unit AA, what types of information did you receive from them? (write 
them down) 
18. How was information AAA received? 
19. Who did you pass that information to first? 
20. How was that information passed? 
21. Was there anyone else? 
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22. How was information AAB received? 
23. Who did you pass that information to first? 
24. How was that information passed? 
25. Was there anyone else? (continue until all types of information have been 
identified and traced) 
26. For agency/unit AA, what types of information did you send to them? (repeat 
these questions until all external agencies have been identified and all 
incoming/outgoing data from this position has been traced) 
27. For position B, whom did you communicate with external to the DASC? (repeat 
the process for all positions held)   
28. Other than the ones we’ve already identified, were there any other  tactical data/IT 
systems you used during OIF? 
29. What did you use ______ for? 
30. What other systems did ____ interact with? 
31. To what extent? 
32. How was the tactical data network maintained? 
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